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Each year the Department of Defense (DOD) is exposed to
great pressure from the public sector and Federal Government
to save money and to be efficient. The Productivity Pro-
gram Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower,
Reserve Affairs and Logistics) brings together approaches for
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measurement of the MHSS. Conclusions are drawn to summarize
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Federal spending has become a growing public and govern-
mental concern. This spreading apprehension regarding the
long trend of increasing costs for government is not at all
surprising. The GNP is expected to rise about 60 percent
from $3,228 trillion in 1983 to $4,589 in 1989; but Federal
spending will be higher by 62 percent for that period (from
$795 billion in 1983 to $1,389 trillion in 1989). The annual
Federal deficit is currently $193 billion. The total Federal
debt will be about $2,318 trillion by 1987 (50.5 percent of
GNP of about $4,583 trillion) . Not only the growth rate of
the Federal Government's cost to the public is alarming,
the budget's sheer size will soon be beyond the comprehension
of the average taypayer. These factors explain, at least in
part, why the costs of government are less and less publically
and politically tolerable [Ref. 1: A-l].
President Carter, in his 1979 State of the Union Address,
made the point that "health care costs are rising one million
dollars per hour, twenty four hours a day and doubling in
cost every five years" [Ref. 2: p. 77]. Another example of
this rapid rise for industry costs is the health care per
capita cost of $1,225.00 which is expected to rise to
$1,882.00 in 1985 [Ref. 3]. A statement was made at the
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American Productivity Center Conference in August 1983, that
the American health care system "now consumes more than ten
percent of the files national product [Ref. 4]. The nation's
health care industry remarkably grew during recent years
of recession while other industries were declining. In 1982,
while the prices for goods and services were growing at four
percent, health care cost grew at a rate of twelve percent
with no discernible improvement in the system's productivity.
While most of these statements concern health services
obtainable in the civilian sector, the Federal Government
(excluding the Department of Defense) spent $116 billion on
health care in 1982, an increase of 13.1 percent over 1981
[Ref. 3: p. 22] . The Department of Defense spends billions
of dollars each fiscal year to provide health care services
to its active duty and retired members, and to their depen-
dents. As in the civilian sector, these expenditures con-
tinue to increase each year (about $4 billion in 1980 to
$7.1 billion in FY 1984) [Ref. 5].
It should be noted that medical services provided by the
military medical departments closely approximate those pro-
vided in the civilian sector. The medical services which
are provided on a day to day basis to maintain the health
status of the military personnel are generally comparable
with the care obtained from civilian sources for the same
illnesses, although military medicine does include some
services which are uniquely military in nature such as
flight medicine and undersea medicine. Additionally, there
are other uniquely military problems or factors involved with
providing health services such as standby requirements for
maintaining facilities and vast stores of medical supplies
for wartime contingencies, providing field medicine for
combat situations, and maintaining other elements which are
required to provide health services under wartime conditions
.
B. THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PRODUCTIVITY PROGRAM
In 1973, the Federal Government expressed is first
formal interest in enhancing productivity [Ref. 6]. Formal
initiation of the Department of Defense Productivity Program
began in 1975 with the issuance of Department of Defense
Directive 5010.31, "Productivity Evaluation, Measurement
and Improvement--Policies and Responsibilities" [Ref. 7].
The directive's purpose was to bring the existing Department
of Defense productivity improvement programs and activities
together under one Federal Government Productivity Measure-
ment Program. This effort at program integration also in-
cluded the Defense Integrated Management Engineering System
(DIMES) which earlier had merged with Warehouse Gross Per-
formance Measurement System (WGPMS)
.
This directive set forth important long-range Produc-
tivity Program policy statements for the Department of
Defense
:
1. The program will direct "...management attention
on achieving maximum Defense outputs within
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available resources levels by seeking out and exploit-
ing opportunities for improved methods of operation...'
2. "Productivity measurement, enhancement, and evaluation
will be an integral element of resource management."
3. The benefits of productivity enhancement "...should
be re-utilized at the lowest level practical to
provide an incentive for management..." to direct
focus on labor cost savings efforts.
The instruction also directed management to establish pro-
ductivity goals as "...an integral part of the Planning,
Programming and Budgeting System as well as resources to
facilitate achievement of our goals" [Ref. 7].
Department of Defense Instruction 5010.34, "Productivity
Enhancement, Measurement, and Evaluation—Operating Guide-
lines and Reporting Instructions," set forth operational
direction for the Department of Defense Productivity Pro-
gram [Ref. 8] . Overall, the instruction provided for:
establishment of a requirement for productivity goals at
all levels; requirements of productivity measurement report-
ing and evaluation; and guidance on work methods, workload
measurement, and productivity enhancing capital investment.
This instruction's primary objective was "to achieve
optimum productivity growth... to help offset increased per-
sonnel costs, free funds for other priority requirements,
and reduce the unit cost of necessary goods and services..."
within the Department of Defense [Ref. 8].
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Each Department of Defense agency was directed to estab-
lish annual productivity goals on every level of management
via an integrated approach. Included were the requirements
to: develop and use productivity indicators; accumulate pro-
ductivity data; utilize productivity and performance data in
manpower requirements development; and implement productivi-
ty measurement and evaluation [Ref. 8].
Given the scope of this thesis, the more important
portion of DODI 5010.34 is Enclosure 3, "Productivity Measure-
ment and Evaluation." Referencing the OMB Memorandum,
"Joint Project for Measuring and Enhancing Federal Produc-
tivity," of 9 July 1973, this enclosure mandates the
establishment of a permanent system for measuring and
evaluating productivity for the Department of Defense under
the Federal productivity reporting system for input to the
Bureau of Labor and Statistics (BLS) . This data was also
to be used for preparation of an annual Federal Productivity
Report. The responsibility for this operation was assigned
to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Reserve
Affairs and Logistics) . The measure value submitted was to
be in the form of a productivity index: "The relationship
between the volume of goods produced or services rendered and
the quantity of resources consumed..." permitting period or
trend data comparison of the input-output relationship of
the activity, organization, agency, department, of function."
Today, major function indices are used within the Department
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of Defense "to determine the extent of productivity coverage
in the major commands and operating agencies of DOD Com-
ponents." The Enclosure noted that "A labor-productivity
index is the type of productivity index most frequently
developed, partly because labor is universally required in
accomplishing all types of work [Ref. 8].
Section VI of Enclosure 3 defined the scope of functional
measurement for the medical function: "Medical-Hospitals.
This area covers personnel performing all types of medical
and dental procedures and services in hospitals and medical
centers." "Medical-Clinics. This area covers personnel
performing all types of medical and dental procedures and
services in clinics." The suggested indicators for both
was the "Health Care Composite Unit," and the similar
"Adjusted Admission Equivalent (USAF) . " It also listed four
important types of measures to be used in measuring organi-
zational efforts
:
1. Effectiveness Measures--"Comparison of current per-
formance against pre-established mission objectives
(goals) ."
2. Efficiency Measures--"Comparison of current per-
formance against either a pre-established standard or
actual performance of a prior period.
"
3. Labor Productivity Measures--"Comparison of labor
performance during two periods of time, usually a
current period and a previous period, known as a base
13
period. It compares actual manpower expended and the
resulting products produced, or services rendered
during the two periods of time and discloses the labor
performance of an activity or group of individuals
during the current period in relation to their per-
formance during a previous period of time."
4. Dollar Productivity Measures--"Comparison of labor
performance against pre-established standards. It
compares actual manpower expenses on a job or task
during a given period of time with the standard estab-
lished for the job or task for that period of time"
[Ref. 8]
C. PRODUCTIVITY MEASUREMENT AND HEALTH CARE
As a direct result of civil and Federal concern, Congress
and Federal regulatory bodies are becoming more and more
interested in methods that promise cost containment and pro-
ductivity improvement. Obviously, Congress, the Office of
Management and Budget, and others want to be able to determine
whether the level of funding is appropriate for the services
provided.
Once productivity can be measured, management can apply
its limited resources in a manner that best produces produc-
tivity improvement. Productivity then, is generally associated
with effectiveness and efficiency: with efficiency, because
this is also concerned with the ratio of outputs per unit,
14
i.e., a comparison of production with capital or other re-
sources, and with effectiveness, which implies the capability
to produce desired results or the capability to reach stated
goals or objectives [Ref. 9: p. 71]
.
The simplistic equation which is generally used for pro-
ductivity ratios in the available literature specifies that:
Productivity Index = Outputs/Inputs
This index, or ratio, may be computed for output per employee,
employee hours, total direct labor costs, capital cost, or
some other similar input. The input element of the equation
is generally relatively easy to specify and obtain data for
computational purposes [Ref. 15: p. 24]. The output element
in some industries is similarly easy to define in total
number; however this is not always the case, and is especially
a problem with health services.
The most critical task encountered in designing a produc-
tivity ratio is deciding what factors the output and input
elements should contain, realizing that there may not be only
one "useful" answer. Thus, to design and implement a
measurement system which will provide valuable insight into
the efficiency of an organization requires that management
decide exactly what it needs to measure. It should also be
realized that productivity measurements in and of themselves
do not generally provide any useful information concerning
efficiency. Rather, to provide useful information, the
15
measures must be capable of being compared to note the dif-
ferences in production over specific time periods and to be
evaluated in relationship to the changes in inputs required
[Ref . 11: pp. 4-5] .
Productivity "improvements," as measured by changes in
the computed ratios, can occur in any of the following
combinations
:
1. Increase output/input remains stable or constant;
2. Increase output/decrease input;
3. Increase output at a rate greater than the correspond-
ing input element;
4. Stable or constant output/input decreases;
5. Decrease output at a lesser rate than the correspond-
ing decreasing input element.
Obviously, productivity "declines" can occur merely by re-
versing the changes in each of the foregoing situations.
However, the output in the health care industry is not
easily specified, and thus is a matter for debate and dis-
agreement. The product of the health care system can gener-
ally be viewed as being in two distinct categories, that is,
a process or outcome [Ref. 12: p. 50]. In viewing the product
of the health care system as a process, the output becomes
medical care itself. This type of measurement is the most
common in use today. It uses surrogate or proxy elements to
define medical care such as the number of physician visits,
admissions, occupied bed days, studies performed, births,
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and therapies provided. Essentially, the focus is on the
collection of hospital "products," that is, the actual input
which is required for the provision of health services.
Additional complications arise in viewing output as a
process since hospitals produce a vast array of such "prod-
ucts." In theory, using activities as a measurement, one
would be required to identify each distinct "product" and
its associated weight in the overall output function. Thus,
the aggregated output of a medical facility might be a
weighted sum of the various health care services. Never-
theless, even this relatively straightforward approach has
difficulty identifying each "product," applying a measure to
it, and then determining an appropriate weight [Ref. 11:
p. 2-1] . There are other methods for viewing hospital output
as "products." Martin Feldstein has argued for using the
hospital "case" as an output: the number of "cases" is
measured by the number of discharges from the hospital, dead
or alive. It should be noted that using Feldstein' s method
raises other questions. For example, what is appropriate
care or input into a case? What of case-mix variations
[Ref. 13: pp. 24-25]?
Marvin Mundel indicates that most hospitals report pro-
ductivity in terms of cost per occupied bed day. He found
it "incredible to think of a bed day as a final output; it
is not what we are seeking to produce. A final output is a
healed patient." He went on to qualify this "healed"
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patient with such additional factors as pediatrics, geriatrics,
adults, diagnosis, and whether they were treated as inpatients
or outpatients [Ref . 10: p. 26]
.
Identifying the outcome of health care is a much more
difficult task than viewing the output as a process or activity
which results in health services. Outcome can be specified
as the health of the patient following care, that is, a
better state of health. However, "what if the patient is
in worse health than before he/she entered the health care
system?" Should this be deleted from the data? The litera-
ture indicates that there is no consensus on the form output
should take when attempting to use outcome as the output.
Daniels is of the opinion that productivity "may be how many
individuals and families are maintained in a state of adapta-
tion, relatively free of physical or psychologically discom-
fort." In this latter instance, the productivity index
would be computed using the absence of visits to a physician
if it was to his efforts in preventing illness. But even
this raises the question: "how do you measure or evaluate
physical or psychological discomfort, and, to what degree"
[Ref. 14: p. 251]?
Donabedian discussed another aspect of defining output
which he feels should be considered in the measurement
system; excess, or standby capacity of the facility and
personnel time. The investment in a hospital and its acquired
capital investments must have some excess capacity to be
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utilized when the need occurs. This same consideration must
be applied to physicians, nurses, and ancillary personnel
who must be ready to respond when the need for their services
arises [Ref. 14: p. 247].
For example, Wolfe reported that, in evaluating a group
practice, it was determined that each physician worked 42
hours per week and was assigned and stood an additional 28
hours a week standby. Thus, forty percent of the time that
the physician devoted to his practice was in standby service
which would not be considered in allocating output elements
for productivity measurement. A problem with considering
this type of "service" for allocation is the determination
of whether the standby was necessitated for a legitimate
reason or solely because of excess physician time [Ref. 14:
p. 252] .
While the foregoing discussion does not imply that produc-
tivity measurement in the health care industry is impossible,
it provides insight into the difficultues in establishing
a productivity measure which actually establishes what is
produced by the health care industry. Thus, it is possible
that no one system is "correct" or "best" for all applica-
tions in the industry. It may require that there be differ-
ent systems for different applications. Therefore, each
system considered for implementation should be evaluated on
its merits in fulfilling its specific prime function. Cur-
rently, the Federal Government is implementing productivity
19
measurement for the military medical health care delivery
system under the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics) and its Department
of Defense Productivity Program Office. The very large size
of the expenditures in both the military and civilian sectors
for health care services, and the very limited inputs into
military appropriations, emphasize the importance of the
efforts made to establish measurement systems to determine
the productivity of the providers of health care for the
purposes of resource allocation, budgeting, manpower alloca-
tions, and capital expenditures, both on the local level and
at the higher organizational levels.
D. THESIS SCOPE AND APPROACH
The objective of this thesis is to attempt to answer the
following questions: (1) does the present productivity measure-
ment methodology in the military health care delivery system
accurately reflect organizational efficiency and allow intra
and inter-organizational comparisons?; (2) are direct
measurements really necessary?; and (3) do we need a
different measurement?
The approach is to address the above questions by consider-
ing the available output measure, the Composite Work Unit
and its proposed replacement, the Health Care Unit; address
the relevance and utility of the cost comparison, Efficiency
Review and performance work statements methodologies of the
Office of Management and Budget's Circular A-76; discuss
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current Department of Defense policy, instructions, and guide-
lines on Efficiency Review as proposed by draft Department
of Defense Instruction 5010. XX to be forthcoming in 1984
with respect to military health services; and finally, propose
a productivity measure.
Chapter II will discuss the Composite Work Unit, the
present measure of productivity in the military health ser-
vices system. The approach is to discuss its historical back-
ground, its utilization with the Department of Defense, use
for external purposes, and provide analysis of its worth
as a productivity measurement of the military health services
system.
In Chapter III, the proposed Health Care Unit, an index
which is being designed to (possibly) replace the Composite
Work Unit, will be evaluated. The discussion will focus on
its design, its validity as a medical service productivity
indice and trend indicator, and its relationship to Diagnostic
Related Groupings, which are an integral part of the prospec-
tive payment system being utilized in some sections of the
civilian and Federal health care sectors.
Chapter IV will discuss the Office of Management and
Budget Circular No. A-76, and Efficiency Review. This chapter
will describe the requirements of the program and provide
an analysis of whether A-76 and/or Efficiency Reviews allow
determinations of effective and efficient utilization of
health care resources mix and related costs. Further, another
productivity measurement methodology will be proposed.
21
Finally, Chapter V contains the conclusions reached in
this study, and suggests policy changes and recommendations
for present or future systems.
22
II . THE COMPOSITE WORK UNIT
A. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Prior to 1956, the output measure in use by all three
military medical services was the "Occupied Bed Day" or
"average number of beds occupied per day." This traditional
surrogate measure was then used as an input element for the
determination of staffing allocations based on a ratio of
staffing required per 100 occupied bed days (inpatient care)
and per 100 clinic outpatient visits. During the 1950 's,
there was increased emphasis on the provision of space
available medical services to non-active duty eligible
beneficiaries. Such beneficiaries, over time, were found to
have shorter hospital stays than the active duty population.
This meant that the turnover of patients was increasing rela-
tive to the number of occupied bed days. This fact, as well
as the Department of Defense and the Bureau of the Budget's
concern regarding the applicability and validity of this work-
load measure prompted the formation of a tri-service committee
to evaluate and recommend changes to the measurement system
[Ref . 15: p. 4] .
Following this evaluation which included data from numer-
ous medical service facilities, the committee recommended
changes to correct the previous omission of live births and
to increase the emphasis on the provision of outpatient care.
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The amended system was to be simple, cost-effective, and
valid over time. From this committee's efforts emerged
the Composite Work Unit, still in use by the military services,
Congress, and the Bureau of Labor Statistics with little
modification to date [Ref. 15: p. 5].
The Composite Work Unit, or the Medical Care Composite
Unit of the U.S. Army, was defined as [Ref. 15: p. 3]:
CWU = OBD + 10 AD + 10 IB + 0.30 PV
where
:
OBD = Occupied Bed Days . An occupied bed day is con-
sidered to be one patient per inpatient bed per
day, regardless of the number of hours the patient
was on the hospital census during that day. OBD
is computed as the total occupied bed days per
fiscal year. [Ref. 16: p. XV-1-3]
AD = Admissions. An admission is the state of one
patient becoming an inpatient at a facility which
provides inpatient medical care. AD is computed
by total admissions for a fiscal year. [Ref. 16:
p. IV-1]
LB = Live Births. This is an admission of a newborn
with mother when the birth occurred at the
mother's admitting facility. LB is computed by
total births in a fiscal year. [Ref. 16: p. IV-1]
OPV = Outpatient Visits. An outpatient visit is
the act of a patient going to an organized or
specialty clinic in an outpatient status for
examination, diagnosis, or medical advice.
This includes inpatient clinical visits at the
facility when the patient is being seen for a
non-related admission problem. Included are
also telephone consultations if an entry is made
in the patient's chart. The classification of
a visit is not dependent upon the professional
level (i.e., physician, nurse, physician's'
assistant or hospital corpsman) , but rather on
24
the medical care provided. OPV is the total
number of outpatient visits in a fiscal year.
[Ref. 17: p. 4-8]
This measure was considered an improvement on the exist-
ing "Occupied Bed Day" measurement in that it accounted for
the following factors: (1) because of varying patient length
of stay, one admission was determined to be equal to the same
staffing requirements for 10 occupied bed days; (2) to
account for newborn care requirements, it was determined
that one live birth was equal to 10 patient days; and
(3), ambulatory patients were utilizing an increased amount
of hospital resources without an adequate quantification of
staffing requirements. This latter problem could be resolved
by including three outpatient visits in the measurement,
essentially the same staffing required for one occupied bed
day [Ref. 18: p. 2-4]
.
The Composite Work Unit as established in 1956 remained
unchanged until 1967. At that time, it was re-evaluated in
comparison with historical data. The medical departments
of the U.S. Army and Navy felt that it should remain unchanged;
however the Air Force changed the outpatient workload weight
from .30 to .25, because the higher weight was believed to
result in an over evaluation of outpatient visits in relation-
ship to inpatient care and the amount of resources required
to provide that type of medical care. This modification by
the U.S. Air Force only affected the manner in which it would
compute the composite work unit; the U.S.' Army and Navy
25
would still use the .30 weight factor for the outpatient
visit element of the Composite Work Unit [Ref. 19].
In 1975, the U.S. Air Force medical service would again
change the method by which it would compute the product
measure. This change separated the computation of services
provided by hospitals and clinics, and those with and those
without dental services. The new revised measure became
the adjusted admission equivalent (AAE) which is calculated
as follows:
Number of AAEs = ADM + .0150 PV + .016 DP + .003 LP
+ . 002 PR + . 004 XR
where
:
ADM = Total number of admissions
OPV = Total number of outpatient visits
DP = Total number of dental visits
LP = Total number of laboratory procedures
PR = Total number of pharmaceutical prescriptions
XR = Total number of x-rays processed
Hospitals without dental services exclude the dental portion
of the computation. Clinic Adjusted Admission Equivalents
are computed in the same manner as hospitals, both with and
without dental services. The measured output is then con-
verted into a weighted output using base year weights, and
26
reported by facility type (i.e., hospital or clinic, with
or without dental services)
.
The Air Force uses the AAE as computed for internal
purposes, and reports Composite Work Units as required for
external purposes [Ref. 15: p. 4-5]. Exhibit I is an exam-
ple of the Adjusted Admission Equivalents and related pro-
ductivity indices as produced by the Defense Productivity
Program Office. It should be noted that the output factor,
Adjusted Admission Equivalents, does not utilize occupied
bed days as a data input element, but rather relies solely
on the number of admissions to account for the inpatient
workload.
Exhibit I contains data which is used by the Defense
Productivity Program Office and the Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics for productivity indices for the U.S. Air Force medical
services. Although the literature indicates that the U.S.
Air Force uses Adjusted Admission Equivalents for internal
purposes and Composite Work Units for external reporting,
the indices reported by the Defense Productivity Program
Office and the Bureau of Labor Statistics for the U.S. Air
Force medical services actually consist of indices estab-
lished with Adjusted Admission Equivalents. A more thorough
explanation of this exhibit will be included with that
given for Exhibits II and III as the information presented
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B. USES OF THE COMPOSITE WORK UNIT
The Composite Work Unit was originally conceived as a
replacement for occupied bed days as a workload indicator for
allocating manpower in military medical facilities. Adopted
by all of the military medical services, it was believed to
provide a measure of all medical services in a single unit
which would provide for fluctuation in workload and which
could be used for internal management. Later, the Composite
Work Unit came to be viewed not only as a staffing tool, but
as an applicable measure of hospital workload. It also came
into use to develop medical programs, supply and overhead
cost in budgeting, and analysis between costs in different
hospitals [Ref. 15: p. 3-4].
The focal point for productivity policy matters within
the Department of Defense is the Department of Defense Pro-
ductivity Program Office (DPPO) which manages the Defense
Productivity Program. Established in 1973, DPPO evolved
from the office which was involved in supporting the Ware-
housing Gross Performance Measurement System, one of the
first systems for measuring overall functional productivity
improvement and relating it to different levels of management.
Presently, the DDPO is involved or responsible for policy
development concerning work force motivation and other pro-
ductivity enhancement efforts. They also provide management
of the Productivity Investment Fund, productivity measurement
in support of Department of Defense programs, research and
30
experiments in productivity programs and monitor Efficiency
Review and management training programs [Ref. 20: p. 3-4].
Discussions with the staff at the DPPO revealed that the
military services submit statistical data for workload measure-
ment to that office. Composite Work Unit calculations,
total manhours , and employee compensation are also submitted.
Exhibits II and III are examples of productivity indices
which are computed by that office for the medical services
provided by the U.S. Army and U.S. Navy.
Exhibits I, II, and II, have indices computed for fiscal
years 1977 through 1981, with 1977 being established as the
base year for trend analysis. The information in the three
exhibits is that which is considered "acceptable" by the
Bureau of Labor Statistics. These exhibits contain those
computations which were performed by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics and returned to the DPPO. It should be noted that
these exhibits are each divided into two sections : measured
activities and total activities. The total activities
section contains the measured, non-measured, and support
activities required to produce the indicated output quantity.
The output of each exhibit was first converted into a
weighted output with a base year weight. These weights are
established for the output elements by equalizing the output
to the employee-years element. Thus, the weighted output
and employee-years elements in base year 1977 are equal
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multiplied by the base weight to create a weighted output,
again based on the 1977 employee-years element. The other
inputs required for trend analysis, employee-years and com-
pensation, are gross numbers not requiring conversion by
weights. However, because 1977 was established as a base
year, all input elements are set at 100.000 or 100 percent.
Each succeeding year's input element is converted to a per-
centage based on the original year's gross numbers. Thus,
note that on each of the Exhibits, items (A)
,
(B) , and (C)
are actually presented as a percentage based on their value
in relationship to the value of the same input element in
the base year 1977.
The productivity of trend indices computed, both for the
measured and total activities computations, are now relatively
straightforward. For example, the productivity per employee-
year for Exhibits I, II, and III is computed by dividing
the weighted output (A) by the employee-years (B) , both
based on their respective percentages rather than their
gross numbers. Each of the other indices is computed in a
similar manner.
Comparing the three Military Medical Services for hospi-
tals is rather interesting in that each is achieving different
hospital productivity indices in a different manner. For
example, the data for the U.S. Air Force shows a decrease
in productivity through fiscal year 1981. This occurred
because the weighted output element decreased from 25,196
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in Fiscal Year 1977 to 24,395.175 in Fiscal Year 1981 while
the employee-years element remained relatively constant at
33,461 in Fiscal Year 1977 and 33,630.215 in Fiscal Year
1981. The U.S. Navy's productivity also decreased for
medical services, but for a different reason. In this
latter situation, the weighted output element decreased
from 18,614 to 18,375.329 from Fiscal Year 1977 to 1981.
However, the employee-years element increased from 23,678
to 24,458 for the same time period. The U.S. Army's medical
service indicates an apparent increase in productivity. While
weighted output increased from 49,751 to 56,345.900, employee-
years remained relatively stable at 49,751 and 51,400 from
Fiscal Year 1977 to 1981, thereby accounting for this apparent
increased productivity. The exhibits also illustrate other
computations which are possible with the reported data, such
as compensation/employee-years, unit labor cost, etc.
The DPPO maintains a dual data base of input elements for
productivity indice computations. One set of data is con-
sidered "accepExhibit" for use by the Bureau of Labor Sta-
tistics and is submitted to them for productivity computations
These indices are then returned to the submitting agency for
their analysis and use. The other set of data is maintained
by the DPPO for its utility in visualizing productivity
trends for internal management purposes within the Department
of Defense. The DPPO measurement base contains over 40 dif-
ferent functions, one of which is medical services, derived
37
from elements submitted by the military services and defense
agencies covering a wide variety of functions performed within
the Department of Defense [Ref. 11: p. 3]. Whipple, et al
.
,
who evaluated the DPPO, indicated that the DPPO activities
are "heavily skewed toward descriptive rather than analytical
or prescriptive topics" [Ref. 21: p. II-9]. It would thus
appear that DPPO is only presenting one view of what has
occurred in productivity trends rather than analyzing what
can be done to increase or change these indices.
Beginning in 1973, the Composite Work Unit data as well
as other productivity input elements has been submitted to
the Bureau of Labor Statistics for use in productivity compu-
tations of the Federal Productivity Program. Contact with
the Director for Productivity Statistics indicates that this
data is gathered for not only Department of Defense medical
services, but from all federal agencies providing medical
services such as the Veteran's Administration and the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services. The Composite Work Unit
data from all agencies providing medical services is aggre-
gated into a Federal Composite Work Unit which allows federal
medical productivity indices to be computed.
The product measurement units from all other agencies
providing non-medical care services, is aggregated with the
medical services indices to produce an overall productivity
index for the Federal government. This final grouping of
data is derived from 28 different groups such as: plants and
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buildings, medical services, and legal services. From these
aggregated work units, the annual federal productivity indexes
are computed. These productivity indexes are normally
printed and available for each fiscal year; however, this
information was not published for this past fiscal year.
The publication normally issued by the Bureau of Labor Sta-
tistics and containing this information is the Handbook for
Labor Statistics .
Along with federal productivity indices, the Bureau of
Labor Statistics also develops private sector productivity
ratios. The gross national level productivity statistics
are developed from the national income accounts which repre-
sent those segments of the economy which consist of the ulti-
mate output of the entire nation. It should be noted that
comparing the Department of Defense productivity indices
with the private sector indices has many inherent problems
stemming from the differences in activities that are covered,
measurement methodologies, and concepts for measurement that
are utilized [Ref. 11: pp. 13-15]. Another official publi-
cation of the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the "Monthly Labor
Review," contains only productivity indices for the civilian
sector and has no data for the federal government.
The Composite Work Unit is also submitted with the annual
budget to Congress to justify funding requests as well as
personnel requirements for the medical services. Exhibit IV
is an example of the forecast Composite Work Unit as submitted
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to Congress with the Fiscal Year 1984, Operations and
Maintenance, Navy budget request, as well as historical
data for several past fiscal years. This particular data
in the exhibit is for Naval station hospitals and clinics
EXHIBIT IV
Historical Workload Data for Station Hospitals and
Medical Clinics
Conversion Composite





Admissions 406.2 xlO 4,062.
Outpatient Visits 22,832. x.3 6,849.6
Births 58.8 xlO 588.0
FY 84 Composite Work Unit Total 13,768.4
********************************************************
Historical Workload Data for Station
Hospitals and Medical Clinics
Workload Factor FY 1982 FY 1983 FY 1984
Average Daily:
Occupied Bed Days 2,034.6 2,147.0 2,268.8
Admissions 357.1 378.6 406.2
Outpatient Visits 21,261.5 21,961.5 22,832.0
Births 51.4 54.6 58.8
Average Daily
Composite Work Units 12,498.0 13,067.4 13,768.4
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C. DISCUSSION AND CRITICISMS
The DPPO has published Department of Defense productivity
overviews on an annual basis which includes medical services
productivity. Since 1967, using the Composite Work Unit,
the DPPO has calculated that medical services productivity
has declined at an average annual rate of 2.3 percent. This
has occurred because apparent output during Fiscal Year 1967
to Fiscal Year 1978 decreased at a 2.1 percent annual rate
while employee years input increased at a . 2 percent rate.
This Department of Defense trend yields a 15 percent overall
drop in productivity during the period of Fiscal Year 1967
to 1978 [Ref. 20: p. IV-20]
.
A study performed by staff members at the Naval Medical
Data Services Center contained an entirely different conclu-
sion. In that report the Composite Work Unit per hospital
employee was adjusted to compensate for the distortion in
measuring productivity trends caused by several factors and
concluded that, while productivity in naval facilities did
not keep pace with productivity- trends in civilian medical
facilities, there was an overall increase in productivity in
naval facilities [Ref. 22: pp. 10-13].
This later study indicates that since 1973 there has been
an increased pressure for military medical facilities to
decrease inpatient lengths of stay, ultimately affecting the
total numbers of occupied bed days used in computation of
Composite Work Units. This resulted in a decline in occupied
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bed days by 57.3 percent as average length of stay for
inpatients declined from 12.68 days in 1973 to 5.92 days in
1979. While this drop in length of stay was a policy success,
it had the added effect of decreasing perceived productivity
in naval hospitals as measured by the Composite Work Unit.
The method of computing the Composite Work Unit does not
have a built-in factor to account for such change. In the
study performed at the Naval Medical Data Services Center,
the point is made that the Composite Work Unit "makes no
distinction between a 'necessary' occupied bed day and an
'unnecessary' occupied bed day." Accordingly, each unneces-
sary occupied bed day will increase the average daily
occupied bed day input factor and inflate the total value
of the Composite Work Unit and, hence, measured productivity
[Ref . 22 : pp. 5-6]
.
Briefly, the results obtained by this study were computed
by: (1) taking two years for comparison purposes, 1973
and 1979; (2) adjusting occupied bed days to correspond with
the length of stay which existed in 1979; (3) computing
Composite Work Units for both years; and (4) adjusting both
years by the American Hospital Association's "Hospital
Intensity Index." This Hospital Intensity Index is a weighted
average of hospital input components, based on period input
prices so that the impact of change in the index is propor-
tional to its importance in overall input cost [Ref. 22: p. 9]





Comparison of Composite Work Units and Comparative Services
Indexes at Naval Facilities for 1973 and 1979
Indicator 1973 1979
Daily:
Composite Work Units, Unadjusted 19,237
Composite Work Units, Adjusted 16,515 14,502
Comparative Service Indicators 20,018 22,794
Personnel 23,086 24,865
Composite Work Unit, Unadjusted
per Employee .8333
Composite Work Unit, Adjusted
per Employee .7154 .5832
Comparative Service Indicator
per Employee .8671 .9167
Thus, decreasing the average length of stay by 57.3 percent,
adjusting the occupied bed days accordingly, adjusting the
Composite Work Unit by the American Hospital Association's
Hospital Intensity Index, and including an increase in
employee year's input, demonstrates an actual increase in
productivity. Despite drawbacks in the Hospital Intensity
Index as a conversion factor for the Composite Work Unit,
the study noted that it "may be useful in adjusting more
traditional workload indicators for service intensity"
[Ref . 22: p. 14] .
The Composite Work Unit assumes that all occupied bed
days are equivalent; however, patients require differing
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amounts of medical care based on illness, severity, age, sex,
and complications. Many authorities in the health care
community believe that hospitals are expending more effort
per patient today than ever before; yet if the extra effort
decreases hospital stay, productivity as defined by the
Composite Work Unit actually shows a decrease [Ref. 15: p. 4].
Literature dealing with the Composite Work Unit as a
workload or productivity indicator contains numerous criti-
cisms of its use as a trend measurement. Many critics are
of the opinion that the Composite Work Unit does not ade-
quately reflect the changing character of the workload in
military medical facilities. A tri-service study performed
several years ago concluded that the initial 3 to 5 days of
an inpatient stay required approximately 10 times the staff
utilization for later periods of hospitalization. There-
fore, manpower requirements of hospitals who emphasize short
lengths of stay must be viewed from the standpoint of patient
turnover and not on the Composite Work Unit which does not
take this rapid turnover of patients into consideration
[Ref. 19J
.
In addition, technological advances in the diagnosis and
provision of medical services to all patients have occurred
rapidly since the mid 1950 's. Technological advances and
the affected product mix have become more and more complex
since the implementation of the Composite Work Unit. Services
such as renal dialysis, cardiac diagnostic studies, abortion
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services, inhalation therapy, organ banks and transplants,
complex radiological procedures as well as numerous and com-
plex laboratory studies, to name but a few, were not ade-
quately accounted for in the Composite Work Unit computations
[Ref . 15: p. 15]
.
Another criticism of the Composite Work Unit is that it
does not differentiate between different types of manhours,
but rather assumes that all manhours are equivalent. A
physician, nurse, or ancillary personnel are equal in so far
as manhours are concerned. It is obvious that the required
hours of different types of "professionals" should not be
aggregated in order to quantify work. "Time is not a pure
factor and one hour of physician time has considerably
greater relative value than a similar amount expended by an
orderly" [Ref. 18: p. 8]. In addition, an outpatient visit
can be produced by differing mixes of manhours of physicians,
nurses, corpsmen, or ancillary personnel requirements. Never-
the less, the Composite Work Unit will measure the same
workload irrespective of differing services provided by
different professionals or cost of the time of the professionald,
The Composite Work Unit does not make a distinction be-
tween an "easy" case and a "hard" case. An "easy" case is
defined as a patient who requires very little in the usage
of hospital resources while the opposite is true of a "hard"
case. Thus, when comparing hospitals which provide medical
services which are extensive and complex in comparison to
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hospitals which provide routine non-complex medical services,
the latter hospital may appear to be more productive. This
would certainly be the case if a higher proportion of
patients were admitted and/or evaluated in the less complex
setting. This problem will be discussed in much more depth
in the next chapter when reviewing the different services
'
methods in treating patients with the same or similar diag-
nosis, both on an inpatient and outpatient basis.
As has previously been noted, the Composite Work Unit
was developed as a tool to be utilized in computing staffing
requirements and later became accepted as a workload measure-
ment. Still later, this unit became a means to justify
funding requirements for total patient care facilities which
is an entirely different function than that for which it was
developed. A study performed in 1972 at the Naval School of
Health Care Administration indicates that "in using Composite
Work Units as a general resource allocator, we would be
forced to say that the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery re-
quired approximately 2 percent more funds in fiscal year
1971 than it required in fiscal year 1957." This was based
on the findings that the total average daily Composite Work
Unit increased 1.76 percent from Fiscal Year 1957 to 1971.
This statement was also based on the assumption that the
funding required to produce one Composite Work Unit was the
exact duplicate in Fiscal Year 1971 as it was in Fiscal
Year 1957. Obviously the assumption that cost remained constant
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per Composite Work Unit over a 14 year period is ludicrous.
All prices of factors which constitute providing medical
care had greatly increased, much more so than the costs
associated with other segments of the economy. Further, the
factors which were utilized to provide medical services had
changed as previously mentioned. During the period of
Fiscal Year 1957 to 1971, the cost associated with exactly
the same quantity of medical care had increased approximately
80 percent. The conclusion of this study was that at a
minimum, the base unit of the measure should be adjusted to
reflect absolute changes in prices of the factors involved
in meeting workload requirements [Ref. 18: pp. 19-20].
Since it has been re-validated on at least two occasions,
the military medical services did not feel that the Composite
Work Unit had sufficient negative aspects to warrant a
drastic change. As a workload measurement input, the U.S.
Army in a test of 22 medical facilities in February of 1974,
attempted to test the validity of the Composite Work Unit
as a staffing tool. The test concluded that although there
was some seemingly staff maladjustments within categories,
the Composite Work Unit utilized to determine these levels
was reasonably accurate for the aggregate staffing projections
[Ref. 23: p. 42]
.
From Exhibits I, II, and III, it should be apparent that
comparisons among the three military medical services may be
difficult, if not impossible, with the data presented. The
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U.S. Navy and U.S. Army indexes are computed using the
Composite Work Unit as an output element, while the U.S.
Air Force indexes are computed utilizing the data obtained
from the Adjusted Admission Equivalents. Data was not
available to determine if the Adjusted Admission Equiva-
lents would compute similar numerical indices if Composite
Work Units were utilized rather than the Adjusted Admission
Equivalents. This criticism is not directed at the Composite
Work Unit, but rather the fact that two different methods
for measuring the output elements is utilized by the Uni-
formed Services which may preclude inter-service comparisons.
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III. THE HEALTH CARE UNIT
A. INTRODUCTION
In January 1979, the Office of the Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Health Affairs commissioned the development
of a new measurement intended to eventually replace the exist-
ing Composite Work Unit. This action was prompted by the
well-known shortcomings of the Composite Work Unit previously
discussed, and the implementation of the Uniform Chart of
Accounts. The Uniform Chart of Accounts is an expense and
workload accounting system utilized by all Department of
Defense hospitals beginning in 1980 [Ref. 24: p. 11].
The Uniform Chart of Accounts was designed to stepdown
overall cost assignments in final, commonly defined, operat-
ing expense accounts. The hierarchy of accounts begins with a
grouping of six categories reflecting total expense and work-
load data: Inpatient Care; Ambulatory Care; Dental Care;
Ancillary Services; Support Services; and Special Programs.
Each of these Functional Accounts is broken down into Summary
Accounts and further, into Subaccounts; however, all expenses
are ultimately aggregated into four final operating expense
accounts: Inpatient Care, Ambulatory Care; Dental Care; and




Uniform Chart of Accounts Hierarchy
ACCOUNT UCA Code
Functional Category: Inpatient Care A
Summary Account: Medical Care AA
Work Center Account: Internal
Medicine AAA
UCA = Uniform Chart of Accounts
Thus, the first level code, A, represents the Functional
Category, the second level code, AA, indicates a Summary
Account, and the third level, AAA, defines the Subaccount.
Two of the Functional Account Categories, Ancillary Services
and Support Services, are considered intermediate expense
accounts and are ultimately assigned to final operating expense
accounts for Inpatient Care, Ambulatory Care, Dental Care,
and Special Programs [Ref. 25]. For further explanation
of the Uniform Chart of Accounts, see Appendix A. It was
the opinion of the staff in the Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense that this newly implemented hospital
accounting system would lend itself to development of a new
and more accurate hospital workload measurement system [Ref.
24 : p. II]
.
The initial design and formulation of a new approach to
measuring hospital workload was conducted by members of the
Department of Mathematical Science at the U.S. Air Force
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Academy. Their final report, produced in June 1980, pre-
sented a new approach to the assessment of output of Depart-
ment of Defense hospitals which was designated the Health
Care Unit.
At the beginning of the study, specific characteristics
of the desired output were addressed. A decision was made
that the Health Care Unit: (1) be expressed as a single
number; (2) not be adjusted for facility type; (3) make mini-
mal use of proxies; (4) use existing data bases; (5) be
adaptable and flexible to allow for future changes as
required; (6) not measure quality of care but rather quan-
tity of care provided; and (7) be useful at all levels
throughout the organization [Ref. 15: pp. 6-8].
B. APPROACH AND FORMULATION
The general approach taken in the development of the Health
Care Unit was to partition the totality of types of care
produced into homogeneous categories; determine the number
of "treatments produced"; take a weighted sum to smooth out
the differences in treatment requirements; and, finally, to
compute a single number that indicates hospital output.
The designers of the Health Care Unit decided that the
Uniform Chart of Accounts adequately provided the needed
basic performance factors because it reports costs and work-
load data aggregated into six inpatient care accounts,
eleven ambulatory care accounts, and two dental accounts.
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This information from field activities is submitted to higher
organizational levels via the Medical Expense and Performance
Report which is divided into the 25 Performance Factors
contained in Exhibit VII [Ref. 15: pp. 11-12]. It should be
noted that these Performance Factors are in actuality the




































Following determination of the performance factors, the







P. = the ith performance factor. For example,
Pj_ = 3750 defines 3,752 dispositions from
the medical service;
W. = the weight factor which will be computed
from the cost of providing medical services
and the cost of providing the corresponding
performance factor health services.
Determination of W., the Weight Factor in the formulation is
a difficult undertaking. The purpose of applying a weight
to each Performance Factor is to determine the relative
value of that Performance Factor in relationship to another
and to allow a single overall product measure for health
services. Thus, the weight allows determination of the rela-
tive value of one service provided in relationship to another:
"what is one outpatient visit to the surgical clinic worth
relative to the same visit in a medical clinic" or the ratio
of W- ,/W, .,. It should also appear that since the Health Care
Unit is based on resource usage, it indicates the intensity
of the care required for that specific Performance Factor.
Using the foregoing computation, the Health Care Unit can be
defined as "that amount of care which has the value of one
dollar or, one dollar's worth of care" [Ref. 15: pp. 11-15].
This appears to be true because each Health Care Unit has
been calculated on the basis of what monetary resources were
required to produce that specific unit. Thomas, et al., used
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a similar equation to formulate a measurement output system
for Veteran's Administration Hospitals. The equation that
they proposed utilized somewhat different components for the
performance factors, but they indicated that weight factors
for the output components would be derived by their relative
consumption of resources based on regression analysis of
their respective cost [Ref. 26: p. 722].
C. APPROACHES TO WEIGHTS
During the initial formulation of the Health Care Unit,
the designers considered several different approaches to
determining the weights and the data available to compute
these weights.
The first approach considered was use of the internal
cost data which was available from the Medical Expense and
Performance Report which is utilized by all three military
medical services. This document reports costs by the 19
major functional accounts as contained in the Uniform
Chart of Accounts. This approach was further subidivided
into four different methods for weight factor development
considerations
:
1. Use overall average cost per service (or Performance
Factor), i.e., take Department of Defense-wide total
cost for all medical services provided and divide
this number by the sum of the Performance Factors




W. = UCA Costs DOD-Wide P . / J" P
2. Use the mean by hospital, i.e., the average cost for
each performance factor at each hospital is computed,
the average of these averages is then computed, and
this number becomes the weight. E.g.,
W. = UCA Costs P. /Hospitals
1 y v
3. Use the mean by hospital, but adjusted for extremes,
i.e., the same as number (2), but disregarding outliers,
that is, those numbers which are more than an estab-
lished specific number of standard deviations from
the mean are discarded.
4. Use median by hospital, i.e., the same as number (2),
the average cost per Performance Factor is determined
for each hospital, then these means are arranged in
order of value and the "middle" number is selected
as the weight [Ref. 15: p. 14].
The resulting weight derived from any of the foregoing
weight development formulations would then simply be multi-
plied by the respective performance factor total to calculate
the output index for that specific Performance Factor which
could then be used by all hospitals. In contrast, Thomas,
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et al., utilized peer groupings for weight factors when
designing the system for the Veteran's Administration
Hospitals. This system involved placing hospitals into
groups based on similarities in terms of total facility
output [Ref. 26: pp. 716-717].
Another method considered for weight development was
to use data external to the organization. Civilian hospitals
or treatment facilities provide comparable medical services
in almost all categories of the above established Performance
Factors. An apparent difficulty in using this approach is
that civilian physicians normally bill patients individually
for both inpatient and outpatient care apart from care
charged by the hospital. In viewing civilian costs of medi-
cal care, costs for medical care that the Department of
Defense incurs under CHAMPUS, the Civilian Health And Medical
Program of the Uniformed Services were considered. This
program is for medical care provided to dependents and
retired members at civilian hospitals with payment shared by
the patient and the Department of Defense. Cost information
for this care is readily available through systems already
established in the Department of Defense, while national
civilian medical care costs would be much more difficult to
obtain [Ref. 27: pp. 14-15].
In using external data, a decision would also have to be
made to determine whether to use national, regional, or
local average costs . A problem which immediately arises is
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that costs for health services and facility expenses are
not uniform from one geographical area to another. Thus,
using local or regional data for weight computations would
not allow applicability of these weights from one area to
another. In a similar fashion, using weights that are
developed from national health services cost data would
give inappropriate weights to facilities providing similar
services but in different geographical areas. This apparent
inadequacy of weight determination from data obtained from
civilian sources applies to weights developed from data
obtained from military sources but to a lesser degree as
will clearly be demonstrated later. For example, civilian
physician fees are not uniform, but vary even in the same
local area; however the salary of a military physician is
essentially stable regardless of the area in which he/she
provides health services. The same can be said of civilians
employed by the military services, that is, a GS-5 will
generally be paid the same salary regardless of the area
in which he/she is employed. This standardized wage or salary
consistency is not true of employees of civilian facilities
in that a nurse's salary may differ depending upon the hospital
or geographical area of employment.
An additional problem which had to be considered by the
designers was that the Performance Factors contained somewhat
similar information for inpatient care, that is dispositions
and occupied bed days. The information for both factors is
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obtained for the same patient for the same period of hospi-
talization, essentially covering the same care. To allow
for this apparent duplication of information, the following
approaches were each considered: (1) use dispositions in
the weight computation, that is, set W 7 through W, ? at and
only use V7, through W, ; (2) use occupied bed days, set W-,
through W, at 0, use W_ through W „; (3) use direct regression
on output for each of the inpatient categories which would
be a weighted sum of dispositions and occupied bed days;
or (4) use indirect regression, methods (1) and (2), in
convex linear combinations and select the best number ex-
plaining the variation in expense from one hospital to another
[Ref . 9 : p. 16]
.
The next weight consideration was to determine or evalu-
ate how often, and in what manner, the weights should be
updated. For example, should it be evaluated continuously,
quarterly, annually, and should it be by base year, cumulative
or done by exponential smoothing [Ref. 15: pp. 17-18]?
.i
D. DESIGNER'S FINAL RECOMMENDATION
In June 1980, the designers of the proposed Health Care
Unit presented their final recommendations concerning the
Health Care Unit, its input factors and sample calculations.
They recommended that the 25 final accounts of the Uniform
Chart of Accounts be used as the Performance Factor inputs
as originally designed. To determine the corresponding
Performance Factor weight, they recommended that for the
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outpatient accounts, each hospital's final outpatient cost
account be divided by the sum of the corresponding Performance
Factor . E.g.,
W = Hospital UCA Cost P./ 7 P.
This results in a cost per Performance Factor. These re-
sulting numbers from each hospital are combined and a mean
and standard deviation are computed. Any numbers which
deviate by more than two standard deviations would be dis-
carded and a new mean would be recomputed. These numbers
would then individually be divided by the Fiscal Year average
cost per disposition to obtain the final weights. E.g.,
W. = P. /Average FY Cost per Disposition
Thus, Health Care Units for Outpatient Performance Factor
weights are determined relative to their value based on the
average cost of inpatient dispositions [Ref. 3: pp. 25-26].
For example, Exhibit VIII contains the original and modified
weights that were computed using the original data. The
original weight computed for each outpatient performance
factor is actually the average cost of a visit to that
specific service for all hospitals that were involved in
providing data for health care unit computation testing.
Thus a visit to the medical service actually cost $21.21 per
visit. The modified weight is this $21.21 divided by the
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EXHIBIT VIII









19. Family Practice CV
20. Primary Medical CV
21. Emergency Medical CV
22. Flight Medicine CV
23. Underseas Medicine CV
24. Denta- Services WDP
















Note: CV = per Clinic Visit
WDP = per Weighted Dental Procedure
average cost per fiscal year disposition cost of $1,129.89.
This modification is performed for each of the outpatient
accounts resulting in a weight which reflects the outpatient
visit in relationship to its value to disposition cost.
To determine the weights required for the Inpatient Per-
formance Factors, a "length of stay" regression was recommended
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For this computation, each hospital inpatient account had
the average length of stay calculated by dividing the total
occupied bed days of that account by the total number of
dispositions for the same account. The cost for each disposi-
tion is also calculated. Next, each of these pairs of
points, length of stay and cost per disposition, is plotted
and a least square fit is accomplished. The weight of the
inpatient disposition factor for the corresponding individual
weight Performance Factor is to be the point at which the
regression line intercepts the vertical axis, while the weight
for the corresponding occupied bed day account is the slope
of the regression line, both divided by the Fiscal Year
Average cost per disposition [Ref. 27: pp. 35-40]. Exhibit
IX is an example of this process for the Medical Care Inpatient
Performance Factors. Thus, as in the computation of the
outpatient performance factors, the weight is determined
relative to its value based on the average cost per disposition
Exhibit X is provided to illustrate the weights for the in-
patient performance factors, both original and modified.
It was recommended that no specific time frame be used
for updating the weight factors. Rather, at 3 to 5 year
intervals, weights should be recomputed to determine if any
significant changes had occurred. The designers felt that
this would provide stability in the weights to allow output
measurements to be easily interpreted and to be comparable







































this method would update the weights to maintain accuracy
and reflect the present level of medical services output
[Ref . 27: Pp. 17-18,32]
.
The actual computation of the Health Care Unit, once
these operations are accomplished is relatively easy, be it
for hospital, military service, or Department of Defense
in total. The Health Care Unit can also be used in the same
manner as the Composite Work Unit for calculating productivity
indices. For example, it can be expressed as Health Care
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Units per physician, per employee, per employee manhours
,
etc. In this formulation, the Health Care Unit was presented
to the Department of Defense for review. Following review
by the three medical departments of the military services and
the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health
Affairs, the decision was that it would not be implemented,
but would require further analysis to determine the validity
of the weighting scheme, implementation, and possible
refinement [Ref. 24: pp. 1-2].
E. INITIAL REFINEMENT
In 1981, the Department of Defense contracted with a
civilian agency to further develop the Health Care Unit,
and in December of that year a report was submitted which
made recommendations for possible refinements to the basic
unit. The major change recommended was that hospitals be
placed in peer groupings. This recommendation was based on
the premise that hospitals vary with the nature and complexity
of cases handled. Such variations occur because of the tenden-
cy to concentrate medical expertise in selected hospitals
which can provide more and better care to those patients
who require complex diagnostic procedures, therapies or follow-
up specialized care.
The military medical services already had three designa-
tions for facilities based on the type of care provided:
(1) primary, an initial contact facility providing primary
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care; (2) secondary, a facility providing some set of specialty
care; and (3) tertiary, a facility which provides indepth
treatment of complex cases, generally a regional or national
medical center. In order to assure hospital peer grouping
across the three military medical services, a scheme based
on peer grouping thresholds was devised. The grouping would
consist of facilities placed in Categories I, II, or III.
The basis for inclusion in each separate group would be on
Health Care Units accumulated, Full Time Equivalent (a FTE
is generally considered to be one employee's annual total
working hours including leave, both regular and sick) number
of physicians, and operating beds of the facility. For
example, a Category Group I facility would be required to
have 0-9,000 Health Care Units, less than 500 Full Time
Equivalents, less than 30 physicians, and less than 70 operating
beds [Ref. 25: pp. 4-16].
The weights would be computed using the indirect regres-
sion method described in the original study, with the resulting
number being divided by fiscal year average cost per disposi-
tion. Each patient admitted would be considered one disposi-
tion, all costs on the day of admission would be considered
"fixed charges," and all costs for the 2nd and subsequent
occupied bed days would be "variable charges." Thus, this
method would eliminate the need to set Performance Factor
Weights 1 through 6 , or 7 through 12 at because each weight
for the corresponding Performance Factor for that specific
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inpatient stay would each gain a portion of the "credit"
for the care provided.
For example, the weight for a Category I facility for
the Inpatient Medical Service would be:
W
x
= 329.30/990.44 = .332
W
?
= 113.6/990.44 = .114
where
329.30 is the fixed cost ($/disp) for Inpatient,
Medical, Category I facility, Disposition;
113.6 is the variable cost ($/bed days) for
Inpatient, Medical, Category I facility,
Occupied Bed Day;
990.44 is the average fiscal year cost per
disposition.
The normalized weights for the other Inpatient Performance
Accounts and Outpatients Accounts would be computed in a
like manner. It was concluded that the peer grouping and
the manner in which weights would be computed would provide
a single measure of product for each facility and account
for differences in case mix, differing levels of care, and
case complexities [Ref . 25: pp. 19-33]
.
Upon completion, the study was evaluated by both the
Office of the Secretary of Defense and the individual mili-
tary medical services. Following this evaluation, there was
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non-concurrence for implementation, at least on the part of
the U.S. Navy. The Navy's reason for rejecting this methodology
for output measurement was essentially based on a study of
admission rates of the separate military services. As a
product measurement system, the health care unit does not
measure the actual output of a hospital, but rather, a quasi-
output. For example, it still includes the measurement of
occupied bed days. Using this factor as an input, one must
assume that all bed days occupied in a hospital for a given
illness are required, and also that the hospitalization is
required for the given illness.
A comparison of admission rates for the three services
demonstrated that the admission rate per 1,000 average strength
was dissimilar. For the U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force, it
was found to be 150.9 and 148.0 respectfully, while for the
U.S. Navy it was only 96.0. This discrepancy in admission
rates was attributable to the different treatment modalities
of choice utilized within the separate military services.
Whereas the U.S. Air Force had an admission rate of 10.1
(per 1,000 average strength) for dental disorders,
the U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps only had an admission
rate of .3. This same study also demonstrated admission rates
of 16.8 and .3, respectively, for the U.S. Army and U.S.
Navy with regard to admissions for common upper respiratory
infections [Ref. 28].
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Obviously, the explanation for the Navy's non-concurrence
is that treatments which are performed on an outpatient
basis require less resources, and thereby gain less "credit"
for productivity indices than the same illness treated as
an inpatient. Thus, based on the manner in which Health Care
Units are computed, the Navy would demonstrate less workload
"credit" because of the differing choices of treatment for
the same illness in the three military medical services. A
far greater impact could occur in the event that the Health
Care Unit came into use as an input element into an equation
developed to allocate resources for health services. In
this latter instance, the Navy would either have to change
treatment modalities, i.e., begin admitting those patients
that are routinely being admitted by the other two military
medical services, or possibly lose some of its ability to
obtain required resources. This is based on the assumption
that although adequate funding may be provided for the pro-
jected Health Care Units, capital investments and small
equipment acquisitions may prove difficult to obtain because
of workload numbers. This would thus affect purchases of
equipment which are "state of the art" and may only be
necessary to provide higher quality of care.
Accordingly, the Department of Defense contracted with
another civilian firm to attempt a further refinement of the
Health Care Unit.
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F. PRESENT HEALTH CARE UNIT
In mid 1983, the study concerning refinement of the Health
Care Unit was completed and presented to the Department of
Defense. The major refinement was to return to the basic 25
preliminary Performance Factors with their corresponding
weights. This study concluded that there was no necessity
to have peer groupings in the computations . A point was
made in this study that there is a "tendency to continually
increase the number of product categories which is caused
by the desire to achieve homogeneity within each category."
The most important reason for deletion of the peer groupings
was that the "weights computed by the peer group is likely
to confuse inefficiency with case mix complexity, and potential
users expressed a desire to have all hospitals use the same
set of weights to simplify application" [Ref. 29: pp. 3-3,4].
In addition, it was determined that using peer groupings
resulted in weights that gave increased value for certain
types of care in smaller, less complex facilities than the
same type of care provided in large, complex facilities.
To illustrate this weight inconsistency, Exhibit XI is provided
from the first refinement study. While several of the Category
II facilities have higher weights than that of the Category
III facilities, all of the "fixed" weights, except for those
of OB/GYN, in Category I hospitals are higher than the
corresponding weight for Category III facilities. Thus,
more credit is given to Category I facilities for the services
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that are provided although the Category III facilities gener-
ally provide much more complex, and specialized health services
with highly sophisticated capital equipment and therapies
[Ref. 27: pp. 6-7]. A possible explanation of this inconsis-
tency in cost of health services may be that smaller or
less complex facilities are being rewarded with higher per-
formance weights because of their inefficiencies based on the




































[Ref. 3: p. 30]
70
Although the 25 performance factors and the basic design
of the Health Care Unit remained unchanged, a different
method for determining the inpatient weights was recommended.
The weights calculated for the refined Health Care Unit are
based on a subsample of average performance. That is,
these subsamples are defined for each Uniform Chart of Accounts
Summary Account. The bed day weights are calculated from a
subsample consisting of middle fifty percent of the sample by
numbers of disposition after eliminating those samples in
the upper and lower quartiles of the sample. The first
step requires that a regression on the subsample for each
Inpatient Uniform Chart of Accounts Summary Account be per-
formed to obtain the coefficients B and B, . The next
o 1
step requires that the application of the following linear
equation be applied to each of the inpatient summary accounts:




EXP = total summary account expense;
DISP = total summary account idspositions
;
LOS = average summary account length of stay;
B and B-. are regression coefficients,
o 1 3
However, it was determined that the parameters of this equa-
tion would increase significantly from year to year because
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of hospital cost inflation, thus it would be necessary to
utilize an additional parameter to compensate for this
inflation. Accordingly, the equation was reformulated as
EXP/DISP = (BQ +B 1 (LOS)) + (1+k^yr 1) + k 2d(yr 2))
where
k, and k~ are the level of hospital inflation;
yr 1 and yr 2 are dummary variables taking the
value of for yr 1 and 1 for yr 2.
For example, B and B, may be derived through linear regres-
sion for Fiscal Year 1980, a base year. Then k, and k~ are
the level of hospital inflation for Fiscal Year 1980 to
1981, and 1981 and 1982, respectively. Accordingly, d (yr 1)
is 1 in Fiscal Year 1981, and d(yr 2) zero for 1982.
Thus the formula was designed to allow use of a base
year and use variables to adjust the inflation for the B
and B, coefficients which were previously obtained by appli-
cation of the sample data to regression.
Lastly, the refined Health Care Unit weights for each
inpatient disposition and occupied bed day account can now
be computed with the following equation:
W^ . = B k„/average cost per dispositionDisp o 2 3 r r




W^ . = weight for each inpatient performanceDispr factor disposition, or W, through W ;
W
, , = weight for each performance factor
occupied bed day, or W 7 through W -




Exhibit XII contains the weights for the Refined Health
Care Unit in the form of dispositions, occupied bed days
and outpatient visits. The data in this Exhibit is for
Fiscal Year 1982 adjusted for inflation.
The refined Outpatient Visit and Dental Weights are com-
puted for each Outpatient and Dental Performance Account
after eliminating facilities in the upper and lower quartiles,
and are based on average cost. This weight, as in the in-
patient factor, is based on facilities operating in the
middle 50 percentile of the sample. This refined weight is
computed by
:
W = Fiscal Year cost per account/average fiscal year
cost per disposition
Thus, each Outpatient Account Weight is computed in terms of
what the value of one outpatient clinic visit is valued at
in relationship to one average inpatient disposition cost.
Referring to Exhibit VII, it can readily be seen that Out-
patient Weights are either at .030 or less and thus, requires
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EXHIBIT XII
Refined Health Care Unit Weights
Occupied Dental
Performance Disposition Bed Day Visit Procedure
























from 10 to 30 outpatient visits to equal one inpatient stay
[Ref . 29: p. A3]
.
G. DISCUSSION AND CRITIQUE
The Health Care Unit as a product measure is superior to
the Composite Work Unit because it partitions the inpatient
care portions of the computation into separate categories,
apportions outpatient care into categories, includes dental
care, and ties the expense of providing this care into a
unit. Thus, the Health Care Unit attempts to provide an
output (medical care) in relationship to an input (resource
consumption) in a single indice . This is in comparison to
the Composite Work Unit which has only four gross inputs in
its computation and it does not attempt to place any dollar
value on the medical services provided. Thomas, et al.,
have indicated that incorporating differing types of inpatient
and outpatient care factors into the output unit will reflect
a more comprehensive view of the hospitals products. They
indicated that this type of formulation should be effective
for use in very large systems [Ref. 26: p. 732]. The composi-
tion of the Health Care Unit does this by utilizing the 25
Performance Factors which cover all of the gross products
(i.e., medical, surgical, etc.) being produced in military
health care facilities today. Nevertheless, most of the
criticisms which have been leveled at the Composite Work Unit
can also be directed at the Health Care Unit.
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In examining the Health Care Unit, one must initially
look at the system which provides the cost and workload data
for the unit's computation, the Uniform Chart of Accounts.
The use of the Uniform Chart of Accounts in respect to the
Health Care Unit is to provide all of the necessary elements
in a factual and accurate manner; therefore, this examination
will only look at the Uniform Chart of Accounts in its
role of providing data.
The Uniform Chart of Accounts was designed not to replace
the existing financial accounting systems at medical facili-
ties, but rather to supplement it by collecting and reporting
expenses and workload data to higher authority via the
Medical Expense and Performance Report. It is a system which
is intended to provide full costing to medical programs which
have been identified as final accounts [Ref . 25: pp. 1-13]
.
A problem which is immediately obvious is that the final
account expenses do not necessarily come under the management
control or responsibility of the chief of service responsi-
ble for that final account. For example, although a patient
may be admitted to the Internal Medicine Service, the ward,
ward staff, and ancillary services are not controlled by
the Chief of Medicine or his/her physicians, nor does he/she
control the cost of providing that service. Nevertheless,
the methodology for computing the Health Care Unit for the
service under his/her cognizance will utilize this cost data
to determine the weights for workload indices that may impact
upon the department.
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Expenses for the ward as reported under the Uniform Chart
of Accounts are aggregated into a cost pool to ultimately
be divided amongst the final account users. The Uniform
Chart of Accounts was designed with sufficient flexibility
for the facility managers to determine their own allocation
procedures for cost pools. Thus, it is conceivable that
there are many different allocation procedures for cost pools
throughout medical facilities in the Department of Defense,
thereby providing minimal consistency to the application of
the methodology for cost pool allocation.
If one considers the input components for the Health Care
Unit, it should become immediately obvious that any indice
which is a surrogate measurement system utilizing this work-
load and expense accounting will be limited to the scope of
the performance factor dimensions. Thus, any of the criti-
cisms which are presently directed at the Health Care Unit
can also be directed at the Uniform Chart of Accounts.
The Health Care Unit, as envisioned, would share some
similarities of the prospective payment scheme being formu-
lated in some sectors of the civilian health industry, the
Diagnosis Related Group, or DRG . The DRG is based on primary
diagnosis, presence of secondary diagnosis, primary surgical
procedure, secondary surgical procedure, age, and length of
stay. Thus, a DRG is clinically and statistically related
in regard to illness and length of stay [Ref. 30: pp. 47-48].
Both of these indices, the DRG and the Health Care Unit,
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actually represent an estimated cost for resources used for
one patient; the DRG in that a patient's illness would be
paid for based on DRG and average cost for a patient stay
within that DRG; a Health Care Unit not related specifically
to diagnosis, but rather to the services utilized in pro-
viding health care to an individual patient based on a
weighted cost factor.
Using occupied bed days as an input factor for workload
computations adds several new problems. This factor can be
easily manipulated to demonstrate increased workload and
possibly has the added negative effect of decreasing emphasis
on shortening lengths of stay for individual illnesses. For
example, a facility with an inpatient capacity which is
not being utilized to its fullest, may begin admitting mar-
ginally acceptable patients because of available beds and
decreased workload reporting. One evaluation of the Health
Care Unit recommended using dispositions as the only inpatient
input factor for inpatients. This was recommended because
each disposition should represent a fixed sum of occupied
bed days. That is, each diagnosis should normally require
a certain defined amount of inpatient care with upper and
lower limits for lengths of stay [Ref. 29: pp. 5-6]. While
this may appear desirable, it should be noted that the DRG's
utilize this type of length of stay element and this does
not necessarily provide corrective action. A study of "case-
mix" with DRG's, found that DRG's established established
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for one area do not necessarily apply to another geographic
area. It was determined that those DRG ' s established for New
Jersey did not apply to patients in Pennsylvania or Ohio,
thus it will be necessary to adjust lengths of stay based
on demographic conditions [Ref. 30: pp. 50-51].
In using the Health Care Unit, an assumption must also
be made that all care provided is quality care as established
by standards. For example, not only must an inpatient occupy
a bed on a specific day, but that a specific type of care
is provided such as appropriate diagnostic studies or therapy
In addition, it must be assumed that the diagnosis for
which the patient was admitted is correct, and that all
physicians are equally competent. This type of assumption
must generally be made when viewing the inputs of health
services as "products," rather than using the actual outputs
of the system if they can be adequately defined.
Utilizing the Health Care Unit as a workload indicator
with differing weights for different types of medical care
provided could make some types of care more desirable because
of their higher value. Looking back at any of the exhibits
for Performance Factor Weights, it is obvious that it is
preferable to have orthopedic or surgical inpatients rather
than medical inpatients. Since orthopedic patients are
granted the higher weight, workload data could be manipulated
by admitting patients to the orthopedic service if the
patient has both a medical and orthopedic problem, although
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the patient should have been admitted for the medical problem.
Surgical inpatient and outpatient care is also given
greater emphasis for the weight factors than that which is
given for medical services. The question then becomes, in
order to be more "productive," should more emphasis be
devoted to acquiring larger orthopedic and surgical staffs,
the performance of more surgical procedures, thereby giving
less emphasis to services with low weighted input factors?
The Health Care Unit does not consider the non-measurable
factors in its computations. Although some of the factors
are extremely important, they are not easily quantifiable.
For example, a facility may be built, equipped, and staffed
to provide differing levels of health services on a contin-
gency basis. This occurs not only to meet war-time contin-
gencies, but peace-time uses as well. There are facilities
located in remote areas where civilian standby or specialized
care is not available, but a requirement exists to have this
care in that area; therefore the health services may not be
utilized to the fullest extent possible.
The Health Care Unit does not provide for direct measure-
ment of other standby services such as those obtainable in
an emergency room environment. At some facilities, the
emergency room is utilized 24 hours a day and thus accumu-
lates workload inputs. Conversely, at some smaller hospitals,
the emergency room is fully staffed to provide health services,
but is only used sparingly because of non-occurrence of
emergencies.
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Health Care Units do not provide a measurement for train-
ing which is performed in most of the large complex facili-
ties. However, many of the large tertiary facilities have a
mission which includes the training of large numbers of
interns and/or residents. The workload which is generated
by these physicians only occurs when they are providing
health services to patients, yet a large portion of their
function is involved in research, training conferences, etc.
A question which should be answered is "Can the Health
Care Unit be utilized as a resource allocator?" To answer
this question, an interesting evaluation can be performed by
reviewing the Health Care Unit's initial refinement study
in which the hospitals were placed into peer groupings. This
study computed Health Care Units for well over one hundred
different military medical facilities with corresponding
indices utilizing the data obtained for those facilities.
The indices computed were for dollars per Health Care Unit,
Health Care Units per physician, Full Time Equivalents, and
operating beds. Exhibit XIII is provided to illustrate the
wide ranges which occurred. The names of the hospitals
involved are not provided, but rather the highest and lowest
values which occurred in each indice . Thus this data can be
used to illustrate the apparent vast differences in hospitals
when using the Health Care Unit as an output element.
The highest and lowest values were not for the same
hospitals, nor were the numerical values taken from one group
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EXHIBIT III
Ranges of Indices for Category I Facilities
Dollars/ HCU/
HCU PHY
Highest Value 1,394.55 696.74
Lowest Value 491.35 56.18
HCU = Health Care Unit
PHY = Physican
FTE = Full Time Equivalent










of hospitals. It should be noted that the most extreme out-
liers were discarded from the data. The ranges in each
category appear to be extreme; however, the numerical value
of all hospitals fall within these boundaries rather propor-
tionately. Thus, to answer the original question on resource
allocation, it would seem reasonable to assume that for
allocation to take place at higher organizational levels, an
equation would be required that would utilize a weight for
each individual hospital. It would thus appear that from
the data presented, any attempt to utilize the Health Care
Unit as a resource allocator would be an extremely difficult,
if not impossible, task.
Weights for the Health Care Unit are based on historical
expenses of the inputs for each of the 25 performance factors,
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yet there are no standards established as to what these
costs should be, i.e., what is the established cost of one
aggregated inpatient bed day for a specific year? Is it
considered reasonable for the average disposition from a
Department of Defense facility to cost $1000 for a specific
year while the average aggregated cost of the same disposi-
tion in a civilian hospital may only cost $750? Is it possi-
ble to establish standards to utilize the Health Care Unit
as a productivity indice or should another system be designed
which can make comparability of medical care efficiency a
reality?
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IV. PRODUCTIVITY AND PRODUCTIVITY MEASUREMENT FOR THE
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE HEALTH CARE DELIVERY SYSTEM
A. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PRODUCTIVITY MEASUREMENT AND
PROGRAMS
The Federal Government now requires the Department of
Defense to become efficient while maintaining acceptable
levels of quality. This requirement is presently focused on
cutting the size of the Department of Defense civilian work-
force while future budgetary plans project a need for more
civilian employees to achieve defined national security
objectives. The anticipated increase in civilian workers is
to be financed through savings yet to be realized from pro-
ductivity improvements within DOD resulting from the Produc-
tivity Program's three important directional elements:
1. productivity measurement,
2. identification of new ways to improve productivity,
and
3. provision of resources necessary to implement such
opportunities
.
All three program elements are brought together into one
integrated approach to accomplish program overall objectives
of productivity improvement and cost containment. Produc-
tivity measurement provides management the opportunity to
observe efficiency of production. Any trend of change can
be evaluated to determine why it happened. Measurement and
evaluation will often reveal some areas of need or opportunities
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for organizational and operational improvement. Once needs
or opportunities for improvement have been identified,
management can develop an approach for productivity improve-
ment efforts and then commit management, capital, employees,
and other resources to defined targets of realistic achievement
After the Defense Productivity Program Office began re-
quiring productivity measurement and the reporting of results
to the Bureau of Labor and Statistics in 1973, the three
military medical departments met in committee to evaluate
traditional measures of activity and found them all to be
"crude." Output measures then in use lacked definitional
commonality and did not satisfactorily reflect the complex,
multi-product nature of the output. The various output
measures available were not even equivalent and could not be
aggregated to proxy total output. A better proxy measure,
the Composite Work Unit, was developed whihc is an aggregate
of four product measures (admissions, live births, occupied
bed days, and outpatient visits) adjusted to equivalency by
weights. Chapter 2 discusses this measure and points many
criticisms
:
1. Resource requirements of the four elements of the
output measure are probably not adequately reflected
in current weights and resource-mix requirements
for the inpatient stay duration may not be roughly
three times the requirements for an outpatient
visit,
2. The CWU does not recognize differences in service-
mix for variances in case-mix intensity, complexity
and duration and assumes that all four measures
are respectively uniform and the service-mix require-
ments are more intense on the first day of inpatient
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stay for the acutely ill; an average day for intensive
care patients is quite different from that of the
routine stay patient in terms of service-mix,
3. Quality of services variation from facility to
facility is not recognized by the CWU and efforts
to improve quality with more resources is negatively
reflected in productivity unless volume is at least
equivalently increased,
4. The result of holding the CWU's weights constant
is unrecognized economies of scale, technology
change, etc., over time,
5. Since the CWU/FTE index (output per employee year)
expresses performance over time, it does not readily
permit comparison of the absolute efficiency of one
medical care entity to that of another of similar
product and size,
6. The CWU/FTE index is a single factor productivity
measure that cannot fully reflect changes in output
caused by inputs other than labor, and
7. Because changes in output cannot be wholly explained
by changes in labor input, the CWU/FTE index is not
useful for management to separate differences in
operational efficiency from differences in patient
characteristics
.
In summary, the CWU fails to provide valid, useful information
to management and does not meaningfully aid in the identi-
fication of areas for potential productivity improvement.
Even so, the CWU continues as the Medical Care function's
output measure for input to the trend workload ratio repre-
senting trend change of effort or resource allocation as
one of 41 general functional areas: Logistics, Personnel
Training, Medical Care, Base Services, Comptroller, Manufac-
turing, Communications, and Physical Security, etc.
The HCU failed to gain acceptance after the Navy chose
to "...nonconcur with the" immediate implementation of the KCU
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(in lieu of the CWU) to be used in the productivity ranking
of both intra and inter Service military treatment facili-
ties," because the "...improvement is negligible..." as the
HCU is "...ineffective in assigning proper weights to ill-
nesses according to the severity of illness and the requirement
for medical resources. The further conclusion is that, due
to the difference in case mix among military facilities and/
or Services, and because of the inadequacy of both the HCU
(as currently developed) and the CWU to properly adjust for
such case mix differences, both indices are inappropriate
for use in making intra and inter Service comparisons of
productivity..." because it would "...signal inefficiency..."
of the Military Health Services System [Ref. 27].
Review of BLS data shows that "from the base year of FY
1967 through 1978, Federal productivity for measured func-
tions is reported to have risen by 17.4% with an average
annual rate of +1.4%..." resulting from "...an average
annual output rate increase of 1.3% with a -0.1% average
annual rate of decrease in employee years." Department of
Defense comparable figures reflect that productivity in-
creased by 14.5 percent; outputs decreased by 3.2 percent;
and employee year inputs decreased by 3.8 percent; all ex-
pressed in terms of average annual rates {Ref. 20].
Federal medical care productivity trends also increased
over time [Ref. 31]. Contrary to Federal overall trends,
the Medical Care Function for the Department of Defense
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showed a 15 percent drop. Another report from the Naval
Medical Data Service Center states that productivity for
Navy hospitals in terras of workload, "...as measured by
Composite Work Units ... declined by 24.6 percent, while the
number of employees ... at Navy hospitals increased by 7.7
percent" [Ref . 22]
.
All productivity trends for the DOD Medical Care Function
figures cited in both reports were considered questionable
by the respective reports and lengthy qualifications were
frequently offered in explanation for value trends reported.
For example, the first report criticized the number of varia-
bles in the CWU (too few) , and the inability of the unit to
reflect change. This report also noted the decline of work-
load after the Vietnam War, technology change, overstaf f ing
,
policy change shortening the hospital average length of
stay, shifts from inpatient to outpatient care, closure of
facilities, Management Information System advances, etc.,
[Ref. 31]
.
Many expert observers were not surprised by these problems
Whippe and La Patra stated that "the productivity data sub-
mitted to BLS and used to construct productivity trends
appears to be so flawed as to be useless without extensive
analysis and qualification." The quality of productivity
measurement was affected by major problems such as the suita-
bility of output measures, output measure comprehensiveness,
and the accuracy and usefulness of data. Further, the Army
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and Navy lack real central control for manpower requirement
statements; somewhat fail to use engineered staffing standards
in management of manpower assignment; and permit abuse of
staffing scheduling systems. DOD overemphasizes direct
labor productivity measurement in lieu of total or partial
factor measurement. Additionally, there is a need for in-
creased attention to the possibility of total factor produc-
tivity measurement because output measures used for many,
if not most, functions are really inputs or intermediate
outputs subject to manipulation if tied to resource alloca-
tion. Accurate and consistent measures of output, whether
direct or indirect, are of extremely high priority and
crucial to any success in generating useful productivity
data" [Ref . 21]
.
One other problem persisting within the productivity
program's changing scope is the reliance on partial or single
factor productivity measures such as the labor productivity
ratio. Total resource allocation decisions are currently
being influenced by measures at hand for lack of better
information. Since the Department of Defense is increasingly
being pressured by Congress and OMB to justify dollars re-
quested based on organizational past performance, a holistic
approach to productivity measurement would seem more reason-
able. This belief is reinforced by comments in DODI
5010.34: "...Components which do not show productivity
improvements or cannot support projections of productivity
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changes shown in their budgetary estimates may find that
both OMB and OSD will make alternative projections based on
other factors such as new investment in plant and equipment
or changes in workload" [Ref . 8]
.
If management's performance is to be judged on the basis
of concrete evidence, the measure must provide relevant and
valid information. The need to evaluate management, control
and resource allocation requires that identifiable variables
of the transformation process be described in quantitative
values. Usually, such values measure the input and output
quantities, and the productivity of the relationship of the
output to the input. Therefore, inputs for the health care
facility are usually measured (quantified) as manpower
(dollars per hour) , beds (dollars per bed) , or in terms of
total resource cost (labor, supplies, facilities, utilities,
etc.) . Output has almost always been measured in terms of
dollars per patient day or output per unit of input. A
different approach recognizes the patient as the most impor-
tant input and counts the input as admissions or outpatient
visits with output measured as patient days. Here, the
productivity measure becomes average length of stay.
All such measures have been criticized for their failure
to represent medical care facility and functional output.
The CWU, HCU and comparable civilian equivalents also fail
this effort as well. They all assume that patients, and the
goods and/or services rendered the patients, are homogeneous,
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yet cannot adequately account for organizational structural,
process, technological differences or change or relate well
to measures of output quality. Finally, the measures are
not usable in that they fail to provide valid and accurate
information for decision makers without gross qualification
and explanation.
A better measure must consider or adjust for several
affects
:
1. The arrival of patients as admissions or outpatient
visits to the medical facility generates workload,
2. Patient characteristics (demographics, disease,
etc.) affect the amount of resources applied to the
patient's needs,
3. Available resources as described in dollar terms to
represent facilities, labor, supplies, utilities, etc.,
4. Organizational characteristics such as structure,
policies, style of practice, size, capacity, etc.,
directly affect the process of patient care, and
5. Output quantity must be relatable to quality.
Such a measure would obtain the quantity and type of
patients of type "n" disease distribution and the respective
total cost in resources to produce the appropriate goods
and services for quantity "q" outputs at a defined acceptable
level of quality after adjustment for organizational
characteristics
.
Not satisfied with the results of the Federal Government's
progress in productivity improvement and cost-containment
efforts, the Office of Management and Budget did not ques-
tion, tc any serious degree, the validity of the measurement
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methodologies. Instead, OMB sought another means of imple-
menting control over Federal spending.
B. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET CIRCULAR A- 7
6
President Carter's administration brought Zero-Based
Budgeting (ZBB) to the Federal Government in 1976. Its
importance of concept was complete per annum analytic organi-
zational review from bottom to top; in essence, an evaluation
of organizational budget based on worthiness of performance.
This government-wide effort at cost containment slowly
ground to a standstill because of the high costs resulting
from intense time and resource demands at all levels of
government.
The Commercial Activities Program was yet another attempt
of the Federal Government to become more efficient and cut
costs. This new opportunity for productivity improvement
was presented in the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
Circular A-76, 1966 (Rev), "Policies for Acquiring Commercial
or Industrial Products and Services Needed by the Government"
[Ref. 32]. Two directions for executive decree implemented
by the circular include:
1. That any "government commercial or industrial activity
..." operated and provides a product or service
that could be obtained from a private source...
"should be provided by such sources if the services
or industrial goods are available, if Federal performance
is not mandated, and if in-house performance is not
cheaper, and
2. That civilian sources usually are cheaper, that
cost comparisons of private performance, and the
"Most Efficient Organization" design's expected costs
must be made based upon:
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a. the same scope of work and the same level
of performance,
b. established "performance work statements,"
c. standard cost factors, and
d. full costs whenever and wherever possible.
This program required a one-time organizational review de-
signed to develop the "Most Efficient Organization" possible
for in-house activities for comparison with civilian sector
sources followed by regularly scheduled efficiency reviews.
Under considerable pressure to better define "Commercial
Activity," OMB Circular No. A-76 stressed that the government
should not start or conduct an activity or service of a
commercial nature for its own purpose unless management
clearly demonstrated that it was in its public interest to
do so unless the function is specifically defined as a
government function. Attachment A to OMB A-7 6 included some
major Department of Defense health care activities as
examples of commercial activities. Further guidance to ease
governmental compliance with OMB A-76 was incorporated into
the revised circular's supplement: Part II, "A Guide for
Writing and Administering Performance Statements of Work
for Service Contracts" (OFPP Pamphlet No. 4); Part II,
"Management Study Guide," and Part V, "Cost Comparison
Handbook." Later, DOD published its own guide, "DOD In-
house Vs. Contract Commercial and Industrial Activities Cost
Comparison Handbook," (DOD 4100. 33h) which promulgated




OMB Circular A-76's initial guidance set forth the
approach of, and requirement for, organizational review.
It required that each Federal activity develop, implement,
and report performance requirement standards and performance
indicators suitable for use equally by the contracting organi-
zation for in-house use and also for the accomplishment of
the same service under contract. All organizational commer-
cial activities were required to be routinely reviewed to
ensure that all aspects of the commercial activity were
most efficient before the cost comparison was to be made.
This review was to be accomplished utilizing management review
and performance work statements techniques described in
the appendices to OMB Circular A-76, Revised.
It is rather obvious that OMB Circular A-76 recognized
that the competitive nature of the free market system is in
itself a valid force for efficiency. This directive has re-
sulted in increased contracting out of "Commercial Activities"
(CA) previously performed by the workforce of the U.S.
Government. Studies by the Rand Corporation and the
Defense Audit Services confirmed the efficacy of the CA
approach utilizing the performance work statement concept
[Refs. 33,34] . Dr. Lawrence J. Korb, in his OSD Memorandum
"Use of Performance Work Statements and Efficiency Reviews,"
dated 27 November 1981, cited success of the CA program for
DOD: "as a result of such reviews, functions have been
reorganized into more efficient operations. These reorganizations
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not only eliminated over 600 jobs, but also about 40 per-
cent of all functions studied since FY 1979 have been more
economical to operate in-house than by contract" [Ref. 35].
A more recent Congressional Budget Office Report, "Contract-
ing Out for Federal Support Services: Potential Savings
and Budgetary Impacts," supports Dr. Korb's optimistic esti-
mates, "...contracting out could shift some 165,000 jobs to
the private sector, reducing total government costs in the
first year by about 4 percent, or some $335 million. In
outyears, however, the annual savings would grow to $870
million..." [Ref. 36].
Although Department of Defense medical treatment facili-
ties have recently contracted out many non-health care de-
livery services, OMB A-76 has permitted the Secretaries of
the three military services to exempt health care delivery
services on request of the respective surgeon's general.
For example, in 1982, the Department of Defense contracted
out only $19,633 million for health services: $917,000.00
was for contracts let for services that were cheaper than
government in-house sources; $694,000.00 was let for reasons
other than cost; $170,000.00 was currently under contract
but under review for cost-comparison; and $17,852 million
was for services that had not been reviewed or approved
[Ref. 37: II J
.
Examination of the range of percent values for manyears
contracted out revealed that as these percent values in-
creased, the activity function became less complex in nature
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It is assumed that this trend reflects management's reluc-
tance or difficulty to contract out activities that are
complex in nature. For example, the DOD medical care function
ranked lowest in manyears contracted out; only .8 percent,
while less complex examples of this trend are reflected in
the 100.00 percent manyears contracted out for Base Main-
tenance and 71.4 percent for products manufactured/fabricated
in-house [Ref. 37: II].
The Medical Function is one of the few activity areas
that also serves to represent structurally intact organiza-
tions or even commands that include clearly identified ele-
ments of some other defined functional areas. For example,
a major medical facility has Logistics, Comptroller, Base
Security, Food Service, Base Maintenance, Transportation,
and many other functions as part of the command structure.
If Medical Care is the major function of the command, it
would be obvious that the commanding officer would be reluc-
tant to contract the command's primary mission to civil
sector sources. Under mandate to enact some degree of
activity cost-comparison, it is also logical to assume that
the commanding officer's choice will be one of the other
functions not too interdependent with the mission's primary
objectives.
In contrast to the above figures, civilian sector hospi-
tals facing the pinch of prospective-payment cost-containment
efforts of government and third-party insurance, are
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venturing more and more into contract management shared
services. Donald E.L. Johnson polled 74 Health Care Manage-
ment Services contracting firms and reported: "...that the
number of hospitals using one or more of their services rose
7.1% to 4,677 in 1982 from 4,367 in 1981." Individual
contracts for such services increased by 16.7% for the same
period. Another article by Linda Punch reported that total
revenues will increase by $7.9 billion from $2.9 billion for
the period 1981 to 1988 [Ref. 38: pp. 89-95; 39: p. 96].
Though studies also showed the CA program was a success-
ful undertaking, the CA concept had problems and issues to
address
:
1. job security for Federal workers;
2. quality of services rendered;
3. the validity of standard cost-comparison values
;
4. who decides which defined CA should be ruled exempt
from contracting out;
5. short-term vs. long-term impacts on budget outlays,
and
6. political, legislative, and regulatory restrictions
on various aspects of the CA program.
Further, Dr. Korb estimated that for the next five year
period (for reasons of national defense or that satisfactory
private commercial sources were not available) , only 20
percent of defined CA's would be subject to efficiency review
under provisions of OMB Circular A-76. However, of this 20
percent, "about 60,000 spaces will be converted to more cost
effective contract operations and efficiency reviews will
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result in the reduction of another 2,400 spaces from more
economical in-house activities." Some further action was
warranted to bring the merits of the CA program to those
activities considered exempt from OMB A-76's requirements
[Ref . 35]
.
C. THE EFFICIENCY REVIEW PROGRAM
Although recognition of the success of the CA process
was evident at high levels of the Federal Government, the
Department of Defense became frustrated in its efforts to
use the A-76 concepts and approach. As mentioned above,
only 20 percent of those activities defined as CA were not
exempt from the Circular's requirements.
In direct response to this problem, Dr. Korb ' s memorandum
directed that all components of the Department of Defense
develop a formal system of reviews for those activities not
considered commercial activities [Ref. 35]. This directive
was followed by another OASS (Manpower, Reserve Affairs and
Logistics) memorandum which required that " . . . DOD components
shall ensure that: an in-house Performance Work Statement
(PWS) is developed with the procedures in OFPP Pamphlet
No. 4 ("A Guide for Writing and Administering Performance
Statements of Work for Service Contracts") to include a
Performance Requirements Summary outlining all performance
indicators, standards and accepted quality levels required
of an activity. Further, a quality assurance measurement
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plan is to be developed and implemented to permit demonstra-
tion of how effective and efficient a given activity is in
meeting the performance standards and "...whatever method is
used to conduct an efficiency review, it shall, at minimum,
consist of analyzing the tasks or requirements outlined in
the PWS" [Ref . 40] . "It should also include pricing out
those tasks in terms of manhours , material, equipment and
formulating an effective mix of staffing patterns" [Ref. 35].
Responding to this direction, Department of Defense
Draft Instruction, 5010. XX, "Operational Improvement/Effi-
ciency Reviews and Resource Determination," stated that "all
activities (of DOD) are to be reviewed by the end of FY 87
and at least once every five years thereafter ... labor standards
will be updated every three years." Further, DOD components
will "...allocate resources based on the most recent staffing
or labor standards..." and shall be "...summarized to the
resourcing level and used to justify requirements in the
PPBS (Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System)..." in
accordance with requirements of the OMB [Ref. 41].
The draft DODI 5010. XX required informal adaptation of
the CA program's Performance Work Statement which "describes
what work is to be done without stating how to do it. It
identifies standards of performance to be met in measurable
terms and defining the allowable variance from those standards."
Briefly, the Performance Work Statement concept is a means
to address an activity's functional .work or task to be
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accomplished in a format that describes the work and sets
forth predefined standards of performance for quantity,
quality and timeliness. The activity is then to be reviewed
and compared against the Performance Work Statement [Ref.
41] .
The three services promptly began implementation of the
new program as directed. In 1984, the U.S. Army incorporated
the Efficiency Review process into the "Army Performance
Oriented Review and Standards" (APORS) program, which is
managed by its Army Training and Doctrination Command (TRADOC)
and is carried out by functional areas through major com-
mands using regionally assigned teams of specialists from
TRADOC [Ref. 42]
.
Following the emphasis of the instructional guidance, the
scope of the program is chiefly oriented towards manpower
needs. For FY's 84 through 89, TRADOC set a planned goal
for jobs to be reduced of 154, 119, 119, 115, and 101 re-
spectively. To make the program work effectively, the Army
recognized the need to develop a close working relationship
with major command and local level military and civilian
position management and classification personnel. Savings
generated from the APORS review was to be shared by TRADOC,
30 percent, and the major command, 70 percent [Ref. 42]
.
The Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower and Personnel of
the U.S. Air Force made the Efficiency Review process inte-
gral to their management engineering program and Efficiency
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Reviews are now being conducted in some 20 functional areas;
with over 350 potential functional areas to be reviewed by
FY 1988. The Air Force is also emphasizing productivity-
enhancing capital investment programs as an important part
of the productivity program [Ref. 43: pp. 13-17].
The U.S. Marine Corps will concentrate its efforts in
three key areas of focus, " . . . CA activities exempted from
cost comparison, governmental research and development
functions," and activity level training emphasizing all
aspects of "...management improvement efforts, including
efficiency reviews" [Ref. 43].
The U.S. Navy left its efforts in the area of efficiency
review at the major command level to maintain maximum flexi-
bility. Even so, the Navy planned to complete 20 percent
of the functional areas identified in its inventory yearly
for the five years [Ref. 43] . A Chief of Naval Operations
Letter, "Efficiency Review (ER) Program," set a goal of 2
percent savings per year for manpower in functions reviewed
[Ref. 44].
Although DODI 5010. XX sets forth direct and explicit
guidance, it leaves many areas of interest open to service
interpretation, adaptation, and further development. How
this directive and its interpretation and implementation
will influence the productivity evaluation and improvement
of the Medical Care Function under the DOD Efficiency Review





The Department of Defense medical care delivery system is
well-known for its assumed inefficiencies and ineffective-
ness. The DOD Productivity Program and various other cost-
containment efforts have failed to effect any satisfactory
change in productivity trends or medical care delivery costs.
Now DOD hopes to gain productivity improvements through use
of the Efficiency Review process. The primary objective
of Efficiency Review would be to identify activities of the
Medical Care function that show potential for productivity
improvement, develop and apply work performance statements
containing performance standards "that clearly describe all
work requirements in terms of what is to be done without
prescribing how it is to be done," to eliminate unnecessary
and inefficient work practices [Ref. 45]. ER is most success-
ful in activity areas that are essentially well-defined and
where tasks are easy to observe and measure. The major
issue for analysis is whether or not Efficiency Review will
prove practical and useful for application to the medical
departments of the military services. The brief and sub-
jective analysis that follows will attempt to demonstrate
that inherent limitations of the ER process and the uniquely
complex, poorly defined, nature of DOD's medical care inputs,
transformation processes, outputs, and delivery system,
when considered together, are formidable barriers to the
success of ER applications within the Medical Care function
of DOD.
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As noted above in Section IV. C, this new program essen-
tially focuses on manpower standardization, potential man-
power reduction, and efficiencies in a functional, not
organizational, approach to productivity improvement review
when military medical organizations are essentially func-
tional by nature. Additionally, examination of the ER process
reveals several other general problems associated with the
Efficiency Review program:
1. Most private industry is profit motivated. Techniques
of organizational review will differ from civilian
sector sources for purposes of adopting established
and successful innovative analytical processes.
A report cites two incidents where management
engineering has resulted in savings in the millions
of dollars for the Texas and New Jersey Hospital
Associations; repaying the costs for the projects
many time over. [Ref. 46: pp. 44-46]
2. Staffing standards in civil service and military
positions must consider wartime standby require-
ments, career patterns and retention considerations.
A doctor filling a pediatrics position in a mili-
tary hospital may be military or civilian. If
the person is on active duty, then the doctor is
cadre staff for nonpediatric war-time duties and
may even be filling the present billet as an 0-6;
under other conditions the job may only require
a GS-13 or an 0-3/4.
3. Most military activity improvement plans would
require approval at a higher level of authority
and may involve long lead-times for productivity
improvement functional activity changes. For exam-
ple, the services now require centralized purchase
and service commonality for major equipment purchases.
A piece of innovative equipment may do away with
the need for a military position; but purchase
requesting, budgeting, acquisition, etc.; and the
reclassification of the job and transfer of the




Efficiency Reviews usually result in civil service
and military personnel reductions and almost
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always face political and managerial resistance
unless positive or negative incentives exist to
encourage the personnel change. Unless careful
long-term planning and relocation efforts are a part
of change, union and political interference are
potentialities that may disrupt productivity improve-
ments. For example, an officer's wives club became
upset when a civilian nurse-practitioner was to
be transferred as a result of subjective decision.
Since there are poor standards developed for such
staffing, the military hospital was not able to
objectively justify the change to a local senator
that was contacted by the wive ' s club and the nurse-
practitioner remained in place. Many persons be-
lieved that this staff member used the medium of
the wive ' s club to avoid transfer.
5. Private source management will usually encourage
personnel at all levels of internal function to get
involved in cost containment. Profit increases and
other corporate rewards are shared to provide incen-
tive for employee cooperation. Currently, the Federal
Government offers little in the way of incentives
for employee involvement in productivity improvement,
with the exception of possible recognition with good
performance evaluations. This, and personal satis-
faction, often does not provide enough incentive to
gain cooperative involvement in organizational change.
For example, it is well known that civil service
employees have inherent fears of "reduction in
force" and view any new efforts of management to
conduct personnel job analysis with jaundiced reluc-
tance. Military managers are often reluctant to
reduce contingency staffing. Success or failure of
ER program effort hinges on support from the top
down through all levels of the organization to be
reviewed.
6. Unless Efficiency Review is integrated with service
programs developed for manpower requirements deter-
mination and the CA program, the differing program
approaches may result in wholly variant manpower
figures for the same function. It is fairly obvious
that efforts at manpower reduction and resultant
savings could be duplicated with differing results
if three programs examine the same functional area.
7. Governmental policy makers will want to require
achievement of planned results. Currently, there




8. Since ER program functional areas must collate with
manpower developmental processes, areas where immedi-
ate change could improve productivity might go un-
noticed. For example, medical treatment facility
laboratory manpower standards have been under develop-
ment for two years in the Navy. New technology
could negate standards overnight.
9. ER program processes are especially suitable for
tasks that are easily defined; whose inputs and
products are identifiable and quantitative. Military
medical treatment facilities have poorly defined
products that are hard to quantify. No satisfactory
measure exists to date.
10. Many noncombatant organizations of the Department of
Defense are extremely dynamic in nature and are not
suitable for evaluative efforts of the sort that
utilize a base review/follow-up approach.
11. Compliance time frames for ER under draft DODI
5010. XX require the application of tremendous manyear
resources to implement the review process across all
functional areas every five years. Unless target
dates are changed or more assets are made available
for this purpose from higher than service levels,
mission objectives, or other cost-containment efforts
such as the CA program may suffer from lack of
resources. [Ref.: DODI 5010. XX]
12. Paragraph A.2.c of Enclosure 3, DODI 5010. XX requires
all CAs to develop PWSs in accordance with OFPP
Pamphlet No. 4. The PWS must include a quality
assurance plan and a performance requirement summary.
Those functions without standard measurable output
would have difficulty implementing such requirements.
[Ref. 41]
13. OFPP Pamphlet No. 4 sets forth a formalized, highly
structured methodology that is time and labor inten-
sive in nature. Service-related and mission or geo-
graphical differences would make the ER process an
expensive undertaking for many CA activities. Short-
term losses may result from these expensive efforts.
[Ref. 32]
14. Unexpected changes in weapon or other technologies
often markedly impact on organizational or functional
structure. Any ER would require a new base review
for such changes.
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15. Loose centralization of Efficiency Review control
of three distinct and competitive services with
major claimant levels making ER decisions may lead
to unsuccessful communication of common standards,
areas of improvement potentiality, and successful
approaches undertaken.
16. Paragraph A.2.e of DODI 5010. XX ' s Enclosure 3 re-
quires the "pricing of those tasks (those identified
in the PWS) in terms of manhours, material, and
equipment and formulating an effective mix of
staffing patterns..." [Ref. 41]. This is poorly
defined and taken literally would imply procedures
very similar to cost-comparison efforts of the CA
program. This effort would be time consuming,
expensive, and stressing to those in the local
workforce.
17. Paragraph A.2.g and h., of Enclosure 3, require
that follow-up audits be conducted [Ref. 41]
.
Comprehensive audits similar to those required
for CA cost-comparison studies would again engender
huge costs that may over-shadow the usually expected
2-4% that could reasonably be expected from the
ER of a functional activity.
The above criticisms are not intended to discredit the
value of the ER process as a viable tool for making govern-
ment more efficient. Rather, they are provided to give
the reader some direction and feeling for the limitations
of ER application to some functional areas that are as
poorly defined, measured, and complex as the military medical
delivery system.
However, assuming that the Medical Care function has
been selected for ER, the appropriate decision maker would
first assemble a team of about 6 to 8 persons. Two team
members should be trained analysts; at least one member
should be a representative of the respective major claimant,
and the rest should be functionally expert workers that
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have been through some related training--such as the Air
Force Functional Review course on board the Kaesler Air
Force Base in Biloxi, MS [Ref. 47: pp. I, 1-2].
After the Medical Care area has been selected as a func-
tional area to be reviewed and the team has assembled, the
general approach would be the drafting of the Preliminary
Efficiency Review Plan; the preparation of the ER Perform-
ance Work Statement; the ER Functional Analysis effort; and
the development and submission of ER Study Report [Ref. 47].
During the phase of development of the Preliminary ER Plan,
the team members will take advantage of every available
source of information and expertise to become knowledgeable
about the functional area to be reviewed. This will include
the examination of regulations, organizational manuals, and
the civilian literature. As necessary, trips to various
sites will be undertaken to gain further data and knowledge
[Ref. 47J.
At that point an economic analysis is usually conducted
by the ER team to identify specific activities 'or areas
within the functional area offering the best chances for
cost-containment savings. Currently, Congress is very
interested in outpatient care delivery systems because of
a Congressional Budget Office study that assumes outpatient
services are over-utilized by non-active duty eligible bene-
ficiaries. This assumption infers that beneficiaries
arrive at the outpatient facility intentionally or
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nonintentionally seeking services that are either unnecessary
or should have been obtained elsewhere, presumably, because
of the freedom of access that "free" care offers the non-
active duty beneficiary. In other words, there are no
financial barriers or negative incentives that preclude
unnecessary utilization. The study does not explain how
over-utilization was or can be demonstrated.
Therefore, it is logical that because of Congressional
interest, an ER team might choose outpatient utilization
as one aspect of the military delivery system that poten-
tially could be improved by an ER process. Possibly, signi-
ficant savings could be realized if this assumption is true
and access can be controlled [Ref. 48: pp. 1-43].
The first thing the ER team would want to know is why
patients seek outpatient medical care: this is because
the ER team would need to know what legitimate care is--
to determine what should or should not be seen at the out-
patient facility. There are many factors that explain patient
service requirements for utilization of a medical care
facility--too many to evaluate. However, Donabedian listed
several important phenomena that indicate, and can represent,
service-requiring potential: "1) people, 2) mortality or
survival, 3) morbidity, 4) situations that require care,
but which cannot be classified as morbidity or mortality,
and, 5) health" [Ref. 14: p. 69].
People: until recently, DOD medical departments could
only estimate the population and population demographics
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that influenced the respective medical facility's resource
and service allocation. A DOD, HEW, and OMB stressed that
the patient demographics of beneficiary status, age, and
sex are essential to evaluate utilization causation, and
recommended that the Department of Defense develop a meaning-
ful data base that could be used for resource planning,
management, and allocation [Ref. 49: pp. 149-152].
A new source for obtaining the needed patient demographics
data is the Defense Enrollment Eligiblity Reporting System
(DEERS) ; a data base system designed to confirm just who
is eligible for benefits provided by the Department of
Defense and the Uniformed Services. The Uniformed Services
include Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, Coast Guard,
Commissioned Corps of the Public Health Service, and Com-
missioned Corps of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) . The Office of the Assistant Secretary
of Defense (Health Affairs) and the Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logis-
tics) at Congressional request instituted the system's
development through contract by Vector Research Incorporated
and Actuarial Research Corporation under a subcontract to
Electronic Data Systems [Ref. 50: pp. D-1,2,3].
One of DEER's subpurposes was to develop and maintain
capability within the data base to provide demographic
data for populations eligible for access to the Uniformed
Services Health Care Delivery System to include CHAMPUS
,
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the Civilian Health and Medical program for the U.S. Uni-
formed Services. The data base can publish a report similar
to Exhibit XIV, listing beneficiary groups by age and sex
for defined "catchment areas." A catchment area beneficiary
estimate report for a medical treatment facility categorizes
all beneficiaries living within the catchment area; which
consists of all five-digit zip code areas within a 40-mile
radius of the MTF for inpatient treatment considerations and
a 20-mile zip coded radius for ambulatory medical treatment
beneficiary estimates. Aggregate reports are available by
service branch; by region, by states and those residing in
the continental United States from those beneficiaries
located overseas. Non-catchment area beneficiary estimates
are also available by state and for the U.S.A. in total
[ Re f . 50].
Three hundred thirty-one military medical treatment
facilities are listed in the data base. One hundred sixty-
four of these are ambulatory care facilities. Thirty-seven
MTFs are located overseas. Many MTFs have notably differing
beneficiary, age, and sex mixes. For example, Naval Air
Station, Keflavick, Iceland is virtually without retired
and retired dependent beneficiaries while Naval Station,
Subic Bay, Phillipines has over 52 percent in the same
groupings. Others that are heavily active duty are typically
skewed to the 18-24 year grouping [Ref . 50]
.
Currently there are problems with population identifica-
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reports are to be used as the basis for patient demographic
evaluation efforts:
1. The DEERS is still a relatively new development
for the Department of Defense and the data collected
to date is not error free,
2. Serious questions about the validity of input remain
and analysis of this data would require careful
authentication,
3. Patient demographics differ markedly from location
to location,
4. Patients are generally free to seek outpatient care
under CHAMPUS or civilian source without permission
of the respective MTF,
5
.
Some inpatient care is also provided under CHAMPUS
after authorization by the MTF,
6. Patients living outside MTF catchment areas are
never required to seek care at the MTF,
7. Active duty and active duty beneficiaries are not
likely to remain in one location very long, and
8. Satellite outpatient treatment demographics are
included in parent MTF reports and are not available
otherwise
.
Many of these and other problems are currently under study
for resolution. One popular proposal in Congress for con-
sideration is the modification of the access pattern for
MTFs by adoption of a "closed enrollment" approach. This
entails registering all beneficiaries in either the MTF,
CHAMPUS, or other programs. Under this concept, the medical
care manager would know who would receive care at the facility
historically, at present, and for the future.
Mortality or survival: mortality can be considered fatal
morbidity. The need for knowledge of mortality rates in
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utilization analysis is usually for purposes of adjustment
to incidence rates of the population. The Department of
Defense only collects information on those patients who die in
military facilities. Some information is available from the
other sources such as the DEERS . Local figures are usually
not available.
Morbidity: Disease is obviously the most common reason
beneficiaries make visits to military medical outpatient
facilities. The measurement of incidence, or incidence rates,
is the most important aspect of morbidity that concerns
utilization measurement. However, the dimensions of disease
complexity, duration, and intensity also are factors that
influence how a person seeks aid for medical care needs.
Morbidity patient characteristics are different for each
medical treatment facility catchment area, yet data on local
morbidity patient characteristics are generally unavailable
at the local level for the ER team's purposes. The nature
of the diseases incident to the catchment area would be even
harder to measure and adjust.
The marketplace is still investigating the problems of
fitting a case-mix to the organization in a manner that mini-
mizes methodology deficiencies. Lave and Lave discussed
one approach to case partitioning that aggregates patients
with similar cases into 17 broad Disease Related Groupings
(DRGs) that defined case-mix in terms of the percentage of
patients in each grouping [Ref. 51: pp. 293-305]. This
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patient grouping methodology attempts to resolve the problem
of defining the services (output) provided by a medical care
facility in a clear, specific manner that is stable, manage-
able and useful. If the DRG is to accomplish this, it must
represent patient care of various types and intensities for
various periods of duration based on the unique needs of the
patients the MTF treats. The classification must place the
patients into a manageable number of classes that are repre-
sentative of particular patterns of resource consumption
that can be identified. This linkage of case-mix to resource-
mix then is considered capable of producing a determinable
cost-mix that permits a statistically stable distribution of
resource use to the population served in a manner that suffices
to establish a product definition for hospitals.
The "International Classification of Diseases Adapted
for Use in the U.S." (ICD-9) is perhaps the most commonly
used classification scheme for the DRG. Other similar classi-
fication approaches are available for use such as the
"Hospital Adaption of ICD-9 (H-ICD) . ICD-9 utilizes a coding
system that has two distinct subsystems: disease entity
classification and surgical procedure classification [Ref.
52 : pp. 5-12]
.
Although all patients would be classified by disease,
not all would have the need for surgical procedure identifi-
cation. The 17 disease entities are further subdivided into
97 subclasses. A three-digit coding system (000-999)
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permits even further elaboration. Today this coding scheme
permits a total of 853 such classes of disease. Even further
decimal definition is commonly in use. The surgical procedure
groupings are subdivided into 8 secondary classes identified
by a two digit coding that permits a current definition of
664 classes. Because sheer volume per classification
would render any careful study beyond practicality, the DRG
attempts an aggregation of values into larger groupings con-
sidered sufficiently related as to represent the enclosed
set of more refined classification in hopes of acceptable
homogeneity [Ref. 52].
An article by Harvey D. Doremus succinctly summarizes
the benefits and limitations of the DRG. The benefits
include
:
1. DRGs are very useful for utilization review
purposes on a regional basis,
2. DRGs can be used as standards in prospective
reimbursement schemes,
3. DRGs can have a place in planning and budgeting,
4. DRGs can be used for efficiency measure elements
for comparative purposes, and
5. DRGs can be used to develop patient profiles for
health care resource scheduling.
Some limitations include:
1. DRGs have differences that are statistically impor-
tant resulting from several attributes such as
patient demographics, environment, resource-mix,
structural policies, regulations and style of
treatment patterns
,
2. Current DRGs are not based on actual patient care
costs but averages allocated on the basis of various
indicators such as square foot per function,
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3. The limitation on variables to be included is probably
due to lack of availability of useful data,
4. Patient information (variable identification is
subject to reliability limitations)
,
5. DRGs are influenced by time changes of resources,
6. Consumption so time values must be done at least
yearly
,
7. DRGs are affected by subjective judgements, and
8. To be valid, DRGs have to be regionally or locally
developed to adequately reflect the uniqueness of
the respective patient population. [Ref. 30]
Doremus outlines an approach to be used for development
of a DRG-based case-mix cost data methodology:
1. Group hospitals by variables and geographic
location,
2. Collect demographic and clinical cost... data for
a sample of patients for each hospital in a given
group,
3. Group each patient into an appropriate DRG according
to demographic and clinical attributes,
4. Calculate the average cost per patient for all
patients grouped in a particular DRG, repeat this
calculation for all DRGs,
5. Calculate the average cost per patient across all
DRGs for all hospitals in the group,
6. For each hospital in the group, multiply the propor-
tion of an individual hospital's patient population
in a particular DRG times the average patient cost
for that DRG,
7. Sum the results of all multiplications in #6 for each
hospital separately, and
8. Compare the results of #'s 5 and 7 ... calculate
an index number for that given hospital. [Ref. 30]
A search of the literature produced little mention of
effort to develop Disease Related Groupings or Ambulatory
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Care Groupings for outpatient visits. One rather obvious
problem would be the identification of sufficient independent
variables to properly classify the patient problem; further
refine the class sufficiently to allow for intensity and
complexity, duration of problem, etc.; and permit clear
resource allocation patterns in a similar assembly of
variables to the DRG ' s variables.
The three military medical departments are now individually
evaluating the possibility of adopting the DRG to internal
planning purposes. For example, a paper published by the
Research Department, Naval School of Health Sciences, des-
cribes their successful use of the DRGs replacements of
the ICD-9 coding scheme using the AUTOGRP Patient Classifi-
cation Scheme [Refs. 52,53].
Situations that require care but are not properly defined
by morbidity or mortality indices: roughly one-half of all
beneficiaries visit clinics for reasons other than disease,
and sometimes, the real reason is not apparent. The hypo-
chondriac is a well-known phenomenon; but other reasons
include administrative paper work and preventative care such
as prenatal, obstetrical, well-baby, and social counseling.
For the active duty beneficiary, required physical examina-
tions for various mission-related purposes are an important
reason for patient visitation. For example, an enlisted
person may be required to see a doctor for a flight physical,
a government vehicle driving permit, a special equipment
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operator's permit, a foodhandler ' s permit, etc. It is
possible that the active duty beneficiary might require some
or all of these examinations.
Health status: There are many definitions of health.
Some attempt to isolate disease from other factors of health.
Others measure health in observable, quantitative, ways
such as the number of days lost from work for a given
period. Again, military sources have little or no data
collection methodology that defines or reflects the health
status of a catchment population.
The previous discussion of Donabedian ' s service-requiring
factors presents some aspects of the difficulty of quantifi-
cation of just one parameter of just one determinant of just
one complexity of the DOD Medical Care Delivery System--
utilization. The ER team must determine what comparative
standards will prove or disprove this statement. The differ-
ences of locale, population, structure, policy, etc., make
this issue extremely hard to quantify or even to put in
subjectively comparable terms. As well, a point of reference
must exist if comparisons are to be made. No one to date
has demonstrated that military care utilization rates can
fully be made comparable with data gathered from civilian
sector sources. Even after adjustments, the issue is whether
or not utilization rates should be close to those of civilian
sector beneficiaries. Even if the difficulties of identifica-
tion of acceptable standards are overcome and assessment is
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possible, the ER team must consider interdependent issues.
Given that beneficiaries over-utilize outpatient medical
care facilities, how can over-utilization be discouraged
but avoid affecting legitimate usage? How can control
devices such as a "nuisance fee" in a system that now offers
essentially free outpatient care avoid harm to those in need
of care that would stay away because of the fee? What would
the presence of the fee do to the morale and retention of
the active duty beneficiary who is accustomed to the present
health benefit package?
Due to constraints of length and purpose, not all aspects
of the utilization issue have been discussed and/or analyzed
nor have those topics addressed been analyzed in depth. The
scope of the above discussion was intended to provide the
reader with some understanding of how assessment of even one
narrow issue related to the complexities of health care de-
livery in the military is beyond the ability of a task force
dedicated to short-term, informal, investigation and resolution
of inefficiencies. The nature of ER is to identify the
common, find standards of quantity and quality applicable
to the functional area group and induce group-like behavior
in the individual element to gain overall savings. The nature
of the military medical care system is that it is different--
variant across lines and levels in complex, interdependent
patterns that vary over time, distance, patient populations,
staffing, facilities, etc. The military medical delivery
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system has unique characteristics that complicate any
measurement of medical care efficiency and effectiveness;
even more so than the civilian sector. Few military or
civilian medical care delivery systems or facilities can
accurately measure or forecast the volume or case-mix that
determines patient demand of resources and services that go
into the products of the facility. There are too many
variables and too many questions. Decisions of policy may
harm or help the facility or the system; the patient or the
group; the group or the population.
The conclusion is that an effort to resolve all of these
and other problems through the ER process will generally
minimize this avenue of cost-containment as an overall
approach to medical care delivery facilities as an effective
methodology to gain efficiency and cost-containment when
applied to specifically health care functional activities.
In some instances, this generalization will, of course, not
be realistic. Successful efficiency review for specific and
well defined activities should prove an effective device
to gain efficiency.
If the Medical Care function is considered inefficient
and ineffective, before decisions are made to attempt reform
through Efficiency Review, an essential question must be
asked, "How inefficient and ineffective is this function
and just how efficient and effective should it be?" Chapters
II and III attempt to demonstrate that past measurement
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efforts did not succeed in answering this question. Whether
or not the military medical care delivery system wants the
question answered, the Federal Government apparently is going
to pursue this question through means of the ER process.
Certainly, the medical care delivery system has not been
considered excempt from this program.
The military beneficiary is not demographically the same
as the civilian counterpart and uncertainty of numbers,
locations, eligibility, health status, sex, age and personality
influence any attempt to quantify the patient-mix that will
arrive at the treatment facility within a given period.
To date, few military or civilian facilities can accurately
forecast or plan for the mix of patient demands and resources
that are needed to service the patient. Of course, if the
clinic is seeing patients at or near an undefinable capacity,
scheduling is merely denial of access. So the problem is
the determination of the share of the approximate population
that can be provided care most economically. The above and
following factors directly influence this evaluation:
physical facility capacity, personnel staffing and availa-
bility constraints, actual total care utilization of the
defined population, other source costs, military standby
and manpower training requirements, and other constraints
of resource availability iRef. 49: pp. 997-998]. Because of
Congressional and Federal decree, the Department of Defense
has attempted to resolve some of the problems of patient
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demographics identification. To gain some understanding of
the complexity of accomplishing even a rudimentary ER of
this activity, some information must be provided the reader.
A typical outpatient clinic may be physically separated from
its parent inpatient facility. A staff of 3-5 physicians,
2-3 physician's assistants and/or nurse practitioners, and
28-35 other supportive staff may serve a daily patient count
of about 125-185 patients. About 50-70 of these will be
active duty patients seen on a first-come, first-serve basis
in a "sick-call" mode. Retired beneficiaries dependents
are usually seen by appointment. Ancillary diagnostic and
treatment services typically include a laboratory, radiology,
pharmacy, treatment and/or minor emergency room, etc. The
staff will be a mix of military officers and enlisted, civil
service, and contract service personnel such as janitors and
medical repair technicians.
For purposes of this discussion, an organizational approach
is considered rather than just examination of manpower char-
acteristics. First, it is understood that information
collected must be accurate, relatable and valid; a notorious
problem with the entire medical care delivery system. It
is reasonable to assume that local level data collection
methods and responses can be sampled for utility within the
scope of the ER.
As mentioned before, certain tasks, activities, functions,
and jobs are easily evaluated using management engineering,
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time study, or techniques. A few personnel such as supply
clerks, typists, receptionists, appointment clerks fit this
circumstance. However, assuming the local command civilian
personnel office is also required to be reasonably efficient,
most jobs that are easily measurable have already been
evaluated on a routine basis for task definition, job
classification, etc. It is reasonable to assume that no
significant savings would result from evaluating these
individual positions. The personnel that offer the most
potential for cost-saving analysis are also the more expen-
sive personnel that make the most decisions; carry out the
most non-routine tasks; and utilize the most additional
resources. This group of personnel includes the physicians,
the nurses, the physician's assistants, and other skilled
personnel such as laboratory and radiology technicians.
Even senior, professionally and technically expert physicians
are reluctant to audit peer efficiency and effectiveness;
especially the more subjective decisions and actions of
their peers.
Since overutilization of the facility's services is
presumed, the patient and the physician are usually considered
the primary agents of this inefficiency. Although non-
active duty beneficiaries have the freedom of choice of
seeking care elsewhere, under CHAMPUS , through private plans,
or even out-of-pocket; this problem is not considered because
the stated objective is to determine the utilization legitimacy
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of those beneficiaries who do seek care at the military
treatment facility.
Another problem confronting those analysts tasked with
conducting an ER on the above mentioned outpatient clinic
is the reason patients come seeking service (s) at military
treatment facilities. The above cited DOD Health Care Study
published in 1975 stated that "while disease is the most
common reason for both active duty and nonactive duty bene-
ficiary visits in military facilities," it accounts for more
than half of nonactive duty visits (62 percent) and less
than one-half of active duty visits (48 percent) [Ref. 49:
p. 602] . It is logical to assume that some means of control
exists to make decisions on utilization need, whether or not
control is effective. In this case, it is obviously the
practitioner who most controls decisions on patient conditions
The Health Care Study states that "...Physicians made disposi-
tion for roughtly 70 percent of all visits," and supervised
dispositions on about 20 percent of all other visits [Ref.
49: p. 602] . To properly understand whether or not potential
improvements in patient utility can be made, the ER analyst
would have to be able to define the more important character-
istics that influence resource utilization in the outpatient
treatment facility. There are primarily two major considera-
tions here: patient service requirements as seen by the
individual patient and as seen by the practitioner; and
physician characteristics that influence disposition decisions
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First, the nature of health status must be understood.
This is a very difficult and complex undertaking inherently
complicated by lack of standard definitional input. Many
researchers have unsuccessfully tried to make the difficult
simply by applying various measures to health status. It
is not purposeful to describe the approaches most likely to
be useful to the analyst. Typical of those potentially
useful to the ER analyst would be utilization rates, workdays
lost rates, and morbidity and mortality rates. These figures
are rarely available for local facilities who report periodic
data for central compilation. Currently a data base has
been established to utilize the DEERS to develop local
utilization rates and other useful planning data. Although
sufficient data has yet to be inserted into the data base,
the Resource Analysis and Planning Study (RAPS) Decision
Support System model has great promise for the future
[Ref . 50J .
Certainly, knowledge of morbidity in the captive popula-
tion would benefit the ER analyst to ascertain the complexity
of outpatient visit patterns for the "typical outpatient
clinic." But the number of potential classifications are
voluminous. The purpose of getting such information together
is to aid in the identification of the output produced and
the resources and services required to satisfy reasons for
the respective patient's outpatient visits. There are
problems in output and related resource allocation
identification.
125
Since definition of the MTFs product or goods and services
has been difficult, most practical managers avoided examina-
tion of the complex mix of resource, process or transformation
and service in favor of traditional single value represen-
tation of medical care such as outpatient visit or patient
day (period average length of stay times period patient
(admissions + live births)) counts. Lave and Lave are
typical of the literature when they label such measures as
"crude," and advocate the measurement of output on the basis
of case-mix adjusted patient visit or patient day [Ref . 51]
.
Berki and others also advocated such adjustment to the
patient visit or patient day output measure [Ref. 54: p. 34]
.
Once patient characteristics are identified, the ER
analyst would be interested in practitioner characteristics
that are influential to the patient disposition process.
Facility size, and the number and type of services and re-
sources available to the physician are of obvious influence.
Constraints on the physician, age, specialty, environment,
health, source of education, experience, and personality are
the more important personal practitioner influences.
DODI 5010. XX and other directives require that the ER
process must make sure that the activity being analyzed cur-
rently has acceptable quality standards and that output must
meet those standards. To date, the military services have
progressively instituted peer and utilization review standards,
professional and credentialing standards, patient profile
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standards, facility and personnel standards, safety standards,
etc. The problem is identification, implementation, and,
especially, acceptance and utilization. There are strong
efforts at inter-service standards consistency being made
today.
If the ER analysis can struggle through the maze of
information needed to identify the patient and practitioner
characteristics. If the information is accurate and avail-
able, and if the analyst is able to measure all of this data,
the analyst must now venture into examination of the physical
aspects of the facility and its relationship with its popula-
tion, internal organization, staffing, and higher command
structure. Recall that DODI 5010. XX and other pertinent
directives discussed above require a costing of activities being
evaluated. Appendix A to this thesis describes the current
cost accounting system adopted by the three military medical
departments: The Uniform Chart of Accounts. This methodology
provides the military medical care delivery system with a
consistnent cost reporting tool that provides information
about costs that previously was not accurate nor available
in many instances. There are problems in using this data.
The information is not relatable to the individual patient
directly and provides average costs per unit that are stepped
down through several layers of allocation based on workload
indicators. The information is typically six months old.
Since the reporting system is fairly new, there are some
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managers who question the validity of the information they
see. There are no requirements for using this information
for purposes of management control. The "typical" outpatient
clinic's cost picture is buried in aggregated accounts that
make tracing relatable costs difficult.
And there are other cost identification problems. Any
attempt to define costs must "...consider in some manner
the contingency (standby) capability also provided (at least
in part) by these same resources (MTFs) [Ref. 49: p. 999].
If a true cost of medical care is to be comparable, the
standby cost of facility, staffing, and equipment must be
considered. Are the costs measurable in terms of cost to
the government, cost to the government and beneficiary, cost
to the government and the beneficiary population, the society,
etc? Are the costs of the beneficiary under CHAMPUS , third
party insurance, and from out-of-pocket to be considered?
What is the relationship of the outpatient costs and the
parent inpatient facility? These and other issues remain
unresolved today.
E. A SUGGESTED PRODUCTIVITY MEASURE
Foregoing portions of this chapter offer the reader some
understanding of recent Federal and Department of Defense
efforts to make government more efficient and to cut costs.
OMB Circular No. A-76 has been declared a successful process
that will eventually address some 20 percent of all Department
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of Defense organizational entities. The military health
services system, allegedly one of the Department's least
efficient functional areas, is not likely to be a serious
candidate for comprehensive application of cost-comparison
and contracting requirements of the CA program. Efficiency
Review, as a program and process, applies many of OMB
Circular No. A-76's best techniques to functional areas of
the Department of Defense that are not evaluated under the
CA program approach. Subsequently, this chapter has attempted
to demonstrate that the ER process, when applied to the
complexities of the military health care delivery system,
will face quantitatively immeasurable areas of function that
are probably beyond the methodology, time constraints, cost-
benefit parameters, and scope of the ER process.
Further, the important problem is performance measure-
ment. Before any productivity improvement decisions are
made, performance measurement should evaluate the actual
situation. Usually, organizational performance is observed,
measured, and reported to management as an integral part of
a management control system. Management's reason for bearing
the expense and effort of such measurement is to gain knowledge
about the given cost center's efficiency of limited resource
allocation to a planned service or process transformation
intended to result in desired quantities of product at an
economically acceptable quality. This information augments
the decision maker's understanding of the cost center's
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efforts so that objective rewards and penalties can be
awarded, and when efficiency is lower than it should be,
take corrective actions designed to make the medical care
delivery system more productive and less expensive to oper-
ate. Managers at all levels of medical care delivery within
the Department of Defense need information that is tailored
to the specific scope of decision processes. Chapters II
and III have attempted to demonstrate that the current
and proposed military health services system performance
measures are not the answer to this need.
This discussion will now summarize a few relevant per-
formance measures and then propose a methodology that incor-
porates dimensions of the medical care delivery systems'
inputs, transformation process, and outputs through selected
and adjusted variables using a modification of the traditional
output/input productivity ratio.
One major problem all along with the military medical
care delivery system's measurement of productivity has been
the development of a common measure and a defined base of
comparison or reference point. Clinic A, of gender "apple,"
generally fails to adequately compare with Clinic B, of
gender "orange," in the measurement of type k products
(l,2,...,n), using inputs of type r (l,2,...,n). In other
words, proxy measures in the past have failed to fairly
represent inputs, transformation processes, and render these
measures comparable against some base of reference. Chapters
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II and III provide reasons for this failure of present
methodology and measures.
Most measurement methodologies incorporate the average
cost of some relative proxy measure of output such as
occupied bed day, the length of stay, or outpatient visit
and have required adjustment to compensate for the difficul-
ties of medical care product or output identification;
adjustment for the poor relationship of average cost per
resource summed over quantity and type of output; and adjust-
ment for equalization of measure terms. This traditional
hospital cost index has been tried in a variety of forms
with limited success.
There are several generally accepted guidelines that
should be noted:
1. The methodology and the measure should avoid per-
verse or negative incentives for the entity measured,
2. The measure should avoid manipulative potential
of the input variables by interested parties,
3. The measure should rely on inputs that are available,
easy to identify and representative of the actual
inputs that go into the transformation process of
the entity and result in the entity's products,
4. The measure should be relatively simple to implement,
use, and understand,
5. The measure should produce results that are single
valued and understandable
,
6. The measure should incorporate a methodology that is
inexpensive and not labor intensive,
7
.
The input process should eliminate as much of the
subjective as is possible, and
8. The efficiency measure should avoid any reference
to quality of performance.
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To be useful for resource planning, budgeting, and manage-
ment, the measure should associate costs with performance.
There are several such relationships in common usage:
a) cost per population; b) cost per output; and c) cost/
percentage relationships. Practical and historical reasons
seem to indicate that any measure developed probably should
reflect a cost per beneficiary or cost per patient episode.
A cost per beneficiary relationship within the measure
has several advantages:
1. The results have commonality that avoids the differ-
ences of service measures such as outpatient visits,
occupied bed days, hours of service, etc., and does
not have to consider the types of outpatient visits
or surgical vice medical occupied bed days,
2. This variable is not easily manipulated by the
activity measured, and
3. A cost per beneficiary measure avoids perverse or
negative incentives because of #2.
A cost per beneficiary feature of a measure would also have
associative negative considerations:
1. This variable does not entirely explain all the
factors which influence or drive the demand for care
and the cost variable, and
2. A cost per output inclusion in the measure would
suffer the disadvantage of too many surrogate labels
for difficult to define outputs and have few of the
advantages of the cost per beneficiary.
Each measure has its own limitations and advantages for
the service provided. Most measures of medical care produc-
tivity restrict the inclusion of surrogate output labels to
cost per occupied bed day or outpatient product to represent
all other products associated with the organization. Of
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course, both are proxy or approximate representations of
aggregate output, assuming homogeneity of the product and
heterogeneity of the patient. Both representations of
product may be manipulated by concerned parties to the benefit
of the measured entity. Inclusion of other service output
cost per service elements also permits organizational manipu-
lation and perverse results.
A cost/percentage relationship can be considered the
relationship of two costs; one to another. These ratios
are exemplified by those in the Uniform Chart of Accounts.
They are useful to point out relationship changes over time
for specific activities or functions. These ratios are useful
to identify abnormalities but should be specifically related
to what they are intended to measure.
Efficiency Review program directives stress the need for
relating the measurement, evaluation, and analysis of pro-
ductivity to some incentive scheme that induces efficiency.
An ideal measure would itself contain an incentive for effi-
ciency and express the value determined in a manner that
permits observation of actual cost per unit of product
proxy.
If made common by DOD requirements, certain conditions
would greatly improve representation of MTF productivity by
proxy measures
:
1. Uniformity of MTF data and definitions of variables/
characteristics
,
2. Uniformity of most MTF policies,
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3. Uniformity of cost center definition, full cost
identification, and recognition,
4. Uniformity of non-direct patient care cost isolation,
5. Uniformity of full cost transfer-pricing methodology,
and
6. Uniformity and capability to trace costs to actual
groupings of patients receiving services (DRGs) .
For lack of a better scheme, medical facilities are
usually grouped on the basis of classifying facilities by
certain variables that are intended to bring homogeneity
to groupings. Typical variables included for linear regres-
sion or cluster analysis are size of hospitals by number
of beds, number of services offered, types of services
offered, number of in-house teaching of residency programs,
number of admissions, etc. This methodology is called peer
grouping
.
The Uniform Chart of Accounts divides medical treatment
facilities into "activity" groups using size, expense, and
to some extent, facility mission. Historically, the services





primary care is offered in a defined general
pattern of care considered basic to all hospitals,
2. Secondary— these facilities offer a higher level of
specialized care and have the capability to handle
a more complex load of patients, and
3. Tertiary--the services designate major regional or
national medical centers as tertiary care centers
.
This level of MTF provides the most complete care
available and usually are resident and specialty
training centers. [Ref. 25]
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Although based on historic data from the UCA, grouping of
facilities is currently based on subjective observation and
with collective consultation from the military medical
departments. It should be noted that changing a facility
from one grouping to another significantly affects workload
weighting. The process of grouping peers must, therefore,
be as objective as possible, remaining neutrally fair. It
is important that such decisions be made at the highest level
of common interest; the Office of the Assistant Secretary
of Defense (Health Affairs). The current preferred methodology
for classification of medical facilities into peer groupings
by the literature is polyethetic clustering analysis. This
is the recommended approach for the proposed measure of this
thesis. A good explanation for this technique is presented
by Phillip and Iyer [Ref. 55: pp. 126-151].
The development of the proposed basic performance indica-





For example, this measure might compare pounds of laundry
produced with labor manhours utilized.
Previous discussion has established the need for a point
of reference—the standard. The selection of one basic
standard selected for this proposal is
:
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actual amounts of output
expected amounts of output
This ratio compares, for example, the actual pounds of laun-
dry processed with a standard of accomplishment expressed in
the same terms. The model permits comparative efforts over
time and across similar health services system facilities
and yields a value of one for performance of any MTF efficient
enough to achieve the expected. Inefficient variance yields
a value of less than one, and, of course, the converse is
true for the facility exceeding their expected efficiency.
A slight modification of this model produces:
total facility period costs
expected facility utilization
This model relates the actual total period costs of a speci-
fied facility to the expected facility utilization and pro-
duces a numerical value that is an average cost per expected
beneficiary utilization of the measured facility for either
outpatient or inpatient values that is meaningful and useful
to the decision maker. For example, the measure might com-
pare actual cost of direct patient care to expected facility
utilization for two similar outpatient clinics.
The measure incorporates four elements of data:
1. Period facility total adjusted costs,
2. Beneficiary groupings for demographic representation,
3. Incidence rates of expected utilization, and
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4. An adjustment factor for intensity of services that
would be rendered to suit the facility's incidence
complexity
.












= adjusted total costs, and
expected adjusted total utilization
where
C = I C±
c.
1
total (adjusted as necessary) costs of
category i.
The total cost data element is to be obtained from the internal
respective sources that generate actual costs related to the
above single event occurrence. To reduce variance, each unit
price can be standardized for the period. For example,
standardize the labor cost by using the averaged billet cost
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for each of the billets assigned to the medical facility and
multiply this value by the number actually assigned to the
billet at the medical facility. Energy costs can be stan-
dardized by using a geographically common unit of measure
such as the price per kilowatt hour. The measure should avoid
inclusion of cost elements not controllable and not direct
patient care for local health care delivery cost centers.
Typically, because of complexity, actual cost elements might
be represented, in proxy, by the following cost elements:











U'. = B. (A.)
3 3 3
where
B- = number of beneficiaries in category j




m = 1 , 2 , . . . , 80 , and
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= vector of adjusted incidence rates asso-
ciated with beneficiary class j
.
The grouping together of beneficiaries in a defined population
is by attributes in common. Therefore, they can be classified
with respect to these attributes. For this classification
to be efficient, it must be based on criteria which clearly
separate one group of the population from the other, reducing
the number of possible attributes to those number of attri-
butes which can be clearly separate, one from the other, in
the population. Next, the attributes or characteristics
should be common to many populations, or all defined popula-
tions. These basic and essential characteristics have almost
universally been income, age, and sex of a person. As
previously mentioned, the DEERS provides this data in a
manner suitable for use in the proposed measure. There are
five defined groupings of beneficiaries in common use by
DEERS
:
1. active duty personnel,




retired dependents , and
5. survivors of active duty and retired sponsors.
Each of these groupings can be related to income by subdi-
viding them into enlisted and officer groupings and finally
to rank groupings.
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The age groupings include:
1. 00 to 04,
2. 05 to 14,
3. 15 to 17,
4. 18 to 24,
5. 25 to 34,
6. 35 to 44,
7. 4 5 to 64, and
8. 65.
And, of course, DEERS recognizes the sex type as male/female
Exhibit XV provides data on beneficiary groupings as of
1 July 1983. The figures represent those beneficiary group-
ings within catchment areas of a 40 mile radius and do not
include all beneficiaries residing in the continental United










: Jl Dl J2 j2 jk jk
where
a = the adjustment factor for incidence rate
-
1 A., based on resource requirement intensity,
and
A., = the incidence rate for (visit) care type k
•^ for population/beneficiary class j .
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The incidence rate adjustment factor reflects the intensity
of resource allocation necessary for a given incidence rate
of a specified event. Adjustment factors can be adapted
from reference sources--such as the California Relative
Value Studies or they can be developed. This should be
accomplished at the level common to the peer grouping or on a
regional basis [Ref. 57]. The incidence of an event is usually
considered to be a dynamic analysis or what is the incidence
rate for a period. The basic formula for a given event
class is:
number of events that occur during a time period
population exposed to event risk for the period
Usually this rate is multiplied by 1000 to put the value in
terms of events per thousand. For the proposed measure,
this event could be dispositions of inpatient or outpatient
case; occupied bed day or outpatient visit. As well, the
event class could be further subdivided into more specific
rates such as the number of first arrival outpatient visits
The morbidity and mortality rates published by the three
military services are other examples of common incidence
rates used to measure populations of the MTF. For purposes
of this thesis, the use of DRGs appears most promising as a
representation of utilization in a performance measure.
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V. SUMMARY AND REMARKS
A. SUMMARY
Chapter I pointed out the requirement and need for pro-
ductivity measurement within the Department of Defense and
discussed the apparent inefficiency of the military health
services system as measured by the current performance indi-
cator. This negative observation, and subjective public and
political opinion, places the military health care delivery
system's future at risk because of current higher level
directives and instructions that tie resource allocation and
policy or structural decision making to productivity
improvement and cost containment efforts. The key issue is
whether or not the current productivity measure, the Compos-
ite Work Unit, truly represents the actual productivity
trend of the health care delivery system. If it does not,
is productivity above or below the recorded trend?
Chapter II addresses the Composite Work Unit and, after
analysis, concluded that for many reasons, the measure is
not really portraying the productivity of the health
services system; and, in fact, may be underestimating actual
performance by a significant variance. Certain aspects of
the measure drive workload counts down as efficient effort
is accomplished.
Chapter III examined the Health Care Composite Unit, or
Health Care Unit, and concluded that this measure is also
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ineffective and inadequate for measurement of productivity
for health services system efforts. Adjustments to the HCU
produced consistently wide differences of productivity for
peer grouping hospitals in test results.
Chapter IV reviewed the findings of Chapters II and
III, and concluded that the health services system of the
Department of Defense continues to report productivity trends
to the BLS in the form of CWUs/manyears of employment and that
results reported were qualified and elaborated upon until
the measure itself produced no meaningful representation of
the system's efficiency status. Some root problems of the
health care delivery system, regarding its assumed current
productivity level, are the readily observable inadequacy
of the productivity measure and the lack of adequate incen-
tives to encourage the system's decision makers to be more
efficient and cost conscious.
Further, the chapter described two new and important
productivity improvement approaches of government; OMC
Circular No. A-76's Commercial Activities program and the DOD
Efficiency Review program. Because of the regulatory exemption
clause of A-76, and public and political sensitivity, the
Commercial Activity Program will apparently have little
impact on the health services system as a whole. Isolated
instances of success for health care service contracting out
have been reported, however, and the program is newly imple-




The Efficiency Review process was subsequently incor-
porated into the DOD Productivity Program as the Efficiency
Review Program for application to those Department of Defense
components and activities not covered under requirements of
A-76. This chapter concluded that, although the program was
new and not yet in use for health services system functional
activities, its future potential for application to, and
productivity improvement of, the system is not significant.
Consideration of complex interdependencies and resultant
indirect effects of change are logical requirements for the
ER process, but many aspects of the system may be difficult
to assess within the ER approach framework. This statement
is not intended to imply that the program's future for
Department of Defense productivity improvement and cost con-
tainment through ER will be less than intended; rather,
that the program will have an increasingly defined role in
the Productivity Program where few areas of professional
health care activity exist that Efficiency Review can properly
evaluate.
For health care functional areas that quantitative and
objective methodologies of productivity measurement can
meaningfully evaluate, Efficiency Review may become a valua-
ble tool for health care delivery management in the Department
of Defense. For example, some activities recommended for
ER study include patient affairs, food services, medical
records, and medical supply activities.
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While no hospital or medical clinic remains free from
complaints, all MTFs gain positive or negative reputations.
Inefficiencies that are noticeable are quickly identified by
internal review process or through external inspection and
are subsequently corrected. However, inefficiencies that
are noticed by patients are usually more subtle. The
external nature of the ER process enables activity observation
from a fresh and different stance. Productivity efforts can
be most fruitful in health care areas through job enrichment
philosophies, workforce motivation studies and programs, and
organizational development.
While the CA program has the spectre of civilian contract
competition and external audit certification to instill
incentive for development of meaningful command MEO statements,
the ER program depends on organizational support at all
levels, from top down, for its success. It is very easy for
management to view ER as just one more mechanism to justify
personnel reduction. The ER program alone without external
control leaves management sufficient freedom to generate a
PWS and MEO based on "present state" operations with a token
2 percent cut in personnel costs. The definitional purpose
of ER will then have been circumvented; efficiencies are
then no more than just another budget reduction.
If ER performance work statements are to be meaningful,
productivity measurement must truly reflect the performance
of the activity examined. Chapter IV provides one suggested
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approach to a performance indicator for health care delivery
that may resolve some of the issues that have been associated
with past measures. The measure can be adapted to any level
of the health services system and provides a methodology
that respects differences of population, patient, health
care services and activities, and product(s). The CA and
ER programs must rely on valid and useful performance indi-
cators as an essential part of the PWS
.
Finally, future approaches for productivity measurement
and productivity improvement for the Department of Defense
Health Services System must be interdependent and dynamic
elements of the overall health care delivery management
process. These sub-processes must complement structural,
policy, and resource allocation decision making at all levels
of the organization. Further, the reward and punishment tools
of management control should be able to rely on productivity
measurement methodologies to identify those areas in need of
analysis and productivity improvement efforts. Although
acceptable methodologies for productivity measurement are
now within reach, analytical processes suitable for quantita-
tive understanding of health care delivery and the development
of standards for performance are only in embryonic agreement
with reality.
B . REMARKS
If the health services system must justify its requests
for money and manpower partially on the basis of productivity
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measurement, a new and better measure must be developed and
implemented that will avoid the pitfalls of the CWU and
HCU. The thesis offers one proposal for consideration that
should result in relative facility homogeneity and adjust
for patient heterogeneity sufficient to the needs of manage-
ment for measurement of productivity. If the results of
measurement are to be useful, the decision maker must be
able to directly relate what the measure indicates to the
decision process. The proposed measure offers promise in
this regard; because it permits comparison of expected to
actual utilization patterns across comparable levels of
activity and over time.
The health services system of DOD should recognize the
positive aspects of ER at the top echelons and coordinate
efforts. Strong central support is necessary or this pro-
gram will face tokenism and resistance from lower level
entities
.
Efficiency Review programs are currently tied to the
manpower planning and manpower standards ' bodies of the
respective services and are functionally oriented toward
personnel savings. Although personnel costs are an important
ingredient of any cost picture for an organization, ER should
take on a more holistic design and should examine all aspects
of health services for productivity and efficiency improvement,
The military health services system should recognize the need
for strong centralization of effort and develop a program
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that is unique to the peculiarities of health care delivery.
Strong centralization, with consistent policies and strate-
gies designed to permit innovation, is necessary for the
ultimate success of the ER approach in the complex structure
of DOD health services delivery.
The ER program should be carefully integrated into simi-
lar efforts going on in other areas of management improvement
such as the CA process, manpower standards development, civil
service job reclassification and audit, and internal review.
Efficiency Review can take advantage of these efforts and
avoid confrontations and disruption if all such efforts are
coordinated.
Efficiency Review planning should employ static evaluative
techniques of ER, but should be developed as a dynamic
process with permanently assigned and trained personnel on
the job. It is easier to make medical personnel efficiency
experts than to train efficiency experts in medicine.
Since Efficiency Review could take on some of the more
rigid and costly aspects of the CA process, it is better to
put Efficiency Review to work directly on those areas where
it will be most effective. The depth of analysis and time
devoted to these efforts should be centered on areas that
are quantitatively measurable. But other, more effective,
mechanisms for health care delivery evaluation are needed to
achieve productivity improvement. The approach can be similar
to the CA process in that it should be more comprehensive;
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more organizationally oriented; more cost comparative;
and address the illusive problems of health services system
over the long term. The incentives for cost containment
must be strong and effective, but awareness of quality must
weight all actions taken for the sake of cost control.
Currently, there is little incentive for military medical
facilities to operate more efficiently since all funding is
internally justified and no profit motivation exists. The
current funding scheme encourages the institution to spend
because there is little reason to save. It is recommended
that further study be undertaken to assess the feasibility
of changing the funding and budgetary system to some approxi-
mation of the civilian prospective payment scheme. The Navy
Industrial Fund has features that promise opportunity for
adaptation to this approach. For example, data services
are now provided on a "reasonable payment for services
rendered" financial structuring placing management at risk
for inefficiency; offering the potential for implementation
of a "quasi-prof it" incentive for rewarding institutions that
demonstrate cost-reducing behavior.
Although the physician is in the minority, with respect
to the overall large number of people employed by the health
services system, the practitioner directly or indirectly is
responsible for the majority of the system's health care
delivery controllable expenditures. This, of course, is
because physicians essentially control the entire care process
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Modification of physician behavior holds promise for
significant savings if the incentives necessary to instill
efficient behavior are identifiable and implemented. One
potential incentive usually effective elsewhere is to reward
or punish behavior as needed through salary. There are many
complexities and difficulties associated with service needs
and other considerations that make this a problem for imple-
mentation for military physicians. However, bonus schemes
and fines are potential tools that can be associated with
behavior and avoid some of these difficulties.
Physicians made aware of what patient care actually costs
for their patients are much easier to influence toward more
efficient behavior. Educational programs that provide some
understanding of costs for ancillary services can reduce
utilization of unnecessary resources. Full-cost accounting
can demonstrate individual case resource and service costs
so that physicians can be compared; individually or as group
members
.
Beneficiaries or consumers are usually unaware of the
cost of health care provided to them because of the "free"
nature of services rendered. Schemes that propose control
of supposed overutilization are unpopular and may not achieve
their purpose. Consumers should, however, be made more aware
of the high cost of medical care. A full-cost accounting
system can provide information directly to the patient or
sponsor detailing costs that were related to respective care
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received. This can be supplemented with educational programs
which emphasize concerns about the costs and alternatives of
health care utilization. It is also possible to develop
incentives that reward efficient utilization such as annual
cash bonuses for those who seek care at a rate less than
expected. It is recommended that further study of cost
awareness approaches be conducted to estimate potential for
cost containment.
Recognition of activity success at productivity improve-
ment and cost containment can be acknowledged through
various approaches. High level awards, publicity, repro-
gramming of some savings achieved back to the activities,
cash awards, etc., are just some of the other obvious positive




The military health services system developed the Uni-
form Chart of Accounts (UCA) as a means to collect and




The implementing DOD instruction stated that the purpose
of the UCA "is to provide consistent principles, standards,
policies, definitions, and requirements for expense and
performance accounting and reporting by DOD fixed military
medical facilities" [Ref. 25]. Other purposes included the
measurement of productivity; the development of performance
and cost standards for "cost effectiveness" and the develop-
ment of informational tools that could focus attention on
inefficiency and poor management. The UCA represents the
culminated efforts of the military health services system
to set common, comparable, standards for the measurement
of performance and the reporting of costs.
Although the UCA provides necessary information to enable
operational managers to design, implement, and utilize
operational control systems, the more important scope of
intent was the improvement of information permitting efficient
and effective management accomplishment of strategic planning
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for the military health services system. The UCA provides
for quantification of efficiency with a cost per unit of
output. The UCA attempts to minimize the subjective or
nonquantifiable aspects of objective accomplishment recognition
and the evaluation of output in terms of effectiveness. The
UCA can be considered an imposed, aggregating cost accounting
system designed to enhance existing reporting and analysis
subsystems of the military health services system's existing
accumulative management control processes; an attempted
blending of the differences in the military missions, system
sizes, hospital sizes, fiscal and financial structures,
reporting authorities, reporting requirements, and other
distinguishing factors.
In the MHSS, use of the UCA primarily would be restricted
to performance valuation, productivity measurement and
resource allocation efficiency evaluation, since profit
maximization is not an objective. The standardization of
cost accounting and reporting by means of the UCA was targeted
toward six other objectives:
1. A uniform MHSS chart of accounts,
2. A commonality of definition for workload, work
centers, and respective cost accounts,




A way to apply performance measurement for internal
and external comparisons, inter- and intra-service
comparisons, and civilian sector comparisons,
5. A means of efficiency and cost measurement, and
6. A process of overhead and ancillary service expense
allocation procedures.
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The UCA and implementing instructions stress that beyond
required reporting structure, the UCA process permitted the
local medical treatment facility considerable freedom to
design supportive local management decision, management
control, and operative control systems for internal purposes.
As a cost accounting system, the UCA is designed to
step-down overall cost assignments into final, commonly
defined, operating expense accounts. One feature of the system
permits identification of nondirect patient care costs asso-
ciated with nonmission functions of the respective activity.
For purposes of fulfilling report requirements of OASDHA,
the UCA provides a broad data base of information for use
in the preparation of the Medical Expense and Performance
Report (MEPR)
.
This five part report is forwarded to OASDHA every three
months. It provides activity cost and performance data to-
gether with a narrative summary where comments, recommendations,
evaluations, and planning summarizations may be included.
The UCA's hierachy of functional accounts begins with a









Each functional account is divided into summary accounts
that are further broken down into subaccounts. All expenses
are ultimately aggregated into four final operating expense
accounts: inpatient care, ambulatory care, dental care,
and special programs. An example for a functional category
of inpatient care is:
Functional Summary Work Center UCA






The first level code represents the functional category,
the second level indicates the summary account, and third
level alpha codes define the subaccounts. Fourth level
codes are permitted for activities to reflect internal
special definitional purposes and, as such, are not considered
as standard by the UCA. These codes are commonly used to
designate remote facilities responsible to the primary
reporting medical facility. Two of the functional categories,
ancillary services (D) and support services (E) are considered
intermediate operating expense accounts that are ultimately
assigned to final operating expense accounts (inpatient care
(A) , ambulatory care (B) , dental care (C) , and special programs
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(F) ) . Third level "Z" codes identify a clinic or activity
that does not fit the standards for UCA subaccounts. These
codes are considered interim, or temporary, and final iden-
tification awaits new, permanent UCA codes. "Z" coding is
identified as "not elsewhere classified." When necessary,
shared costing is permitted in cost pool accounts designated
by an "X" at the third level. The costs are then distributed
among the respective subaccounts in a mutually acceptable
manner. A filler cose, "Y" , is used at the third level to
avoid a blank space in the identification of fourth level
entities (i.e., EEYA)
.
Each of the functional categories has cost and workload
collection (input and output) to produce some cost per unit
of workload. Expenses and measures of output are provided
for each account. For example, support services (UCA-E)
output is represented by measures such as square footage or
pro rata of services, but there is no efficiency measure
since these accounts are intermediary in nature. Efficiency
for inpatient accounts (UCA-A) is measured by dividing the
total account expenses by the number of occupied bed days
per interval credited to each account. Visits are applied
to ambulatory care accounts (UCA-B) . Dental care accounts
(UCA-C) input is measured in terms of weighted dental proce-
dures based upon the mix of time and resources devoted to
procedure performance. Ancillary care accounts (UCA-D)
inputs are identified by departmental units such as prescriptions,
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hours of service, etc. Special programs (UCA-F) include
military unique accounts that are deducted from the patient
related care system's overall expenses to provide a better
understanding of the facility's direct patient care costs.
General ward expenses are an example of an intermediary
account process that is stepdown sequenced to professional
services' final operating accounts on the basis of a two-way
daily tally of ward occupied bed days of inpatients for each
care service and the ward (reported monthly) . Ward UCA
codes do not get measured in terms of costs per workload
unit since they are considered "pooled accounts."
B. UCA DATA BASE
All financial and workload summary data goes into the
facility UCA data base on a quarterly basis. This data base
is structured as follows:
The UCA code dictionary or Account Subset Definition
(ASD) associates a full and valid listing of facility
UCA codes with the correct identification of workload
distribution on the workload data sheet or SAS . This
permits control of expense allocation. The workload
data base or SAS groups records in sets, identifiable by
number, enabling assignment of costs. The SAS also
measures the work center (by UCA code) services ren-
dered of intermediate accounts as applied to final
account work centers. The Direct Expense Schedule (DES)
or expense data accumulates direct expense data for
each UCA code. The SAS specifies and directs the step-
down of intermediate account expenses to the final
accounts. This stepdown process is completed in three
phases: direct expenses are allocated to work centers
via the DES; the SAS redistributes the expenses to




The Computation Summary provides the functional account
(by UCA) and its categorical summary. This accumulates
total accumulated direct expenses; total support services
expenses acquired; total ancillary services expenses ac-
quired; and, total costs from pooled accounts. Final total
expenses (direct expenses before stepdown = total of final
expenses) aggregates this information.
The Detailed Unit Cost Report details the total expenses,
output measures, and a cost per unit of output for use in
analysis at the local level for management control purposes.
Both reports are useful for further analysis to reflect
departmental, activity or facility performance. Examination
of deviant unit costs can be examined for true significant
changes in workload or expenses. False deviations can be
traced to assignment of erroneous expense amounts under
stepdown or erroneous workload data entry. The UCA provides
improved capability to make comparisons (intra- and inter-
service and civilian source) of uniform expense and workload
data, but doesn't offer utilization guidance. The UCA does
enhance cost awareness; it does provide more accurate and
complete expense information; it does assign expense responsi-
bility to the appropriate work centers; it does provide for
categorization of management cost effectiveness; it does
facilitate the interpretation of cost consideration in the
decision making process; and, finally, it provides for a
more meaningful work count.
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The UCA is not an expense and workload collection system,
but many features of the UCA are relatable to a cost account-
ing system. Further, the UCA is intended to be complementary
to military accounting; only expenses are collected and re-
ported, other characteristics of a cost accounting system
are not present. Many UCA accounts do not correspond to
specific organizational units but to entire programs. A
service may consume or utilize resources from ancillary or
support services, but the responsibility center has no
direct control over the respective service provisional costs.
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